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Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in
1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility
In a Perjury-Plagued System
By ,BARRY TARLow*
IT has been said that decisions of the higher courts do not affect
police behavior but only police testimony.' When, for example, an of-
ficer testified under oath that a defendant obligingly opened the trunk
of a car, handed the officer a contraband-laden shoebox and advised
the officer, "[y]ou can take whatever you want,"2 the Supreme Court
of California merely noted that "[d]efendant's testimony, not surpris-
ingly, differed from that of the officer."'  Then, applying long estab-
lished guidelines of appellate review, the high court deferred to an "im-
plied" finding of the trial court that the officer was somehow telling
the truth.4
Mr. Justice Brennan has observed, in the context of a hearing to
determine the voluntariness of a confession, that a hearing on improper
acquisition of evidence "normally presents the factfinder with conflict-
ing testimony from the defendant and law enforcement officers about
what occurred . . . ." Ordinarily "the question before the factfinder
is whether to believe one or the other of two self-serving accounts of
* J.D., 1964, Boston University Law School; Member, California Bar. The au-
thor, a criminal law practitioner in Los Angeles, has been in the forefront of the effort
to promote the recognition of the validity, reliability, and admissibility of the polygraph
examination in judicial proceedings.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to John B. Mitchell, J.D., 1969, Stan-
ford University, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., Note, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices
in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87, 103 (1968).
2. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 602, 477 P.2d 409, 412, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385,
388 (1970).
3. Id., 477 P.2d at 412, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
4. But see, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968): "i1o sane
man who denies his guilt could actually be willing that policemen search his room for
contraband which is certain to be discovered." Id. at 549, quoting Higgins v. United
States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
5. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 492 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
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what has happened ..... , This dilemma was present in People v.
Dickerson,7 when an officer asserted that the defendant's common-law
wife, nine months pregnant, had willingly let the police enter the family
home to seize evidence implicating Mr. Dickerson in a burglary. The
woman maintained that the police disregarded her objections and en-
tered. According to the court of appeal, the legality of the search was
deemed by the trial court to pivot upon credibility. Viewing the
woman as a "putative spouse, bearing this man's child,"8 and the officer
as a disinterested "man performing his duties,"' the court was required
to resolve "as. . .in most criminal cases" a conflict between the two
"diametrically opposed statements of facts."'10 The trial court stated
that it "must believe one or the other.""'  Naturally it chose the of-
ficer's version.
On appeal, Justice Kaus empathized with -the trial "court's ap-
parent reluctance to find the officer's version to be correct. It certainly
approaches the inherently improbable."'" However, he concluded that
the trial court's criteria for weighing the officer's testimony against that
of the wife were "highly suspect."' 8  The trial court had apparently
ignored the following considerations: "the natural desire of a police
officer to see a criminal brought to justice," the fact "[tihat law enforce-
ment is often a 'competitive enterprise,'" and the potential civil and
administrative sanctions facing "a police officer who has conducted an
illegal search and seizure.""
Other courts have also intimated at least a minimal awareness of
the seeming omnipresence of the police practice of adding to or sub-
tracting from the facts. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, Justice
Harlan forecast rather accurately that police who deny third-degree tac-
tics will "lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers."' 5 Adams v. Wil-
"liams was predicated upon the fact that "a person known to Sgt. Con-
6. Id.
7. 273 Cal. App. 2d 645, 78 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1969).
8. Id. at 649, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 650, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
11. The appellate court found that the trial court did not have to believe either
witness. As the search had been made without a warrant, the burden of justifying the
procedure rested with the prosecution; the factfinder's inability to determine which of
the witnesses was telling the truth should have resulted in a holding that the prosecution
had failed to sustain its burden. Id.
12. Id. at 651, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
13. Id. at 650, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
14. Id. at 650 n.4, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 403 n.4. See also Theodor v. Superior Court,
8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
15. 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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nolly approached his cruiser and informed him that an individual seated
in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist."1
This "fact' had given Chief Judge Friendly cause for wonder, since the
phantom informer was not invented until the second suppression hear-
ing in the case; the officer's first version was that he was responding
to a police radio report.1 7  The California Supreme Court has even im-
plied that police uniformly lie about the existence of "furtive" gestures
to justify auto stops and searches. 8 Perhaps the most bizarre item is
found in California v. Krivda,'9 where, as amicus curiae, Illinois urged
abolition of the exclusionary rule "because it causes the police to per-
jure themselves in hundreds of cases.""0
One solution to the problem may be provided by the science of
polygraphy. In the leading California case of People v. Cutler,2' Judge
Allen Miller explained a primary reason for reliance on expert opinion
based upon polygraph examinations:
It is the experience of this court during his ten years of presiding at
criminal -trials that the great majority of trials on [the] issue of
guilt or innocence turn on the credibility of witnesses that perjury
is prevalent and the oath taken by witnesses has little effect to deter
false testimony. The principal role of a trier of fact is the search
16. 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972).
17. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 36 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd on rehearing, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
18. People v. Superior Court (Kiefer), 3 Cal. 3d 807, 827-28 n.13, 478 P.2d 449,
462-63 n.13, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 742-43 n.13 (1970). See also United States v. Marshall,
488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1974), where the appellate court overruled the trial court's fact-
finding as to the veracity of the narcotics agents and branded them as perjurers:
"These appeals present a distressing picture of the notions of the agents of the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ... who were involved in the case about the manner
in which they are to perform their duties and their obligations toward citizens under
the Constitution. ... Two of the agents seem quite willing to make false affidavits,
in which facts are distorted to achieve a result, such as a finding that seized evidence
was in plain view." Id. at 1170-71.
19. 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
20. Oral Argument for the State of Illinois as Amicus Curiae, California v.
Krivda, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 4034, 4036 (1972). Three judges and a New York state pros-
ecutor have argued that the burden of proof should be shifted to the state in so-called
dropsy cases because of prevalent police perjury. People v. Barrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 369,
270 N.E.2d 709, 714, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 890 (1971) (Fuld, C.J., dissenting). But per-
jury prosecutions are rare; one judge said he would have referred a witness to the district
attorney for perjury investigation except for the fact that the witness was a police officer.
People v. Carter, 26 Cal. App. 3d 862, 875, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327, 335 (1972).
21. No. A176965 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. Nov. 6, 1972), 12 Crim.
L. Rptr. 2133 (1972). After becoming convinced that the decision of the trial court
would be affirmed and establish binding appellate authority supporting the admissibility
of polygraph test results, the prosecution abandoned its appeal. 14 Crim. L. Rptr. 2420
(1974). See notes 65-69 & accompanying text infra.
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for truth and any reasonable procedure or method to assist the
court in this search should be employed 22
It is important to observe that Judge Miller did not focus solely
upon the collateral inquiries then before the court as factfinder; rather,
though only as dictum, the Cutler opinion expressed concern with per-
jury which affects the issue of a person's guilt or innocence. 23 Other
courts have voiced similar apprehensions.24
If he judicial system is to fulfill its duty of searching for truth and
maintaining integrity, it must commence a war against perjury.2 5 The
war cannot be won with weapons restricted to cross-examination, infer-
ences from demeanor, and other relics from the crossbow era of Henry
II. The arsenal against sophisticated witness mendacity must be
equipped with the most advanced, accomplished, and effective scienti-
fic system devised to date. Unless we are interested in the preserva-
tion of institutionalized perjury, there is no tenable reason why quali-
fied polygraphers should not be welcomed by courts confronting cred-
ibility questions; 26 clearly, polygraphy "appears to have something val-
22. 12 Crim. L. Rptr. at 2134.
23. The court concludes that the polygraph method of assisting in the search for
truth should be employed to determine the ultimate issue as well as collateral issues such
as search and seizure legality, the question presented directly in Cutler.
24. For cases involving the problem of perjury relating directly to substantive
questions of guilt or innocence, see, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (murder
conviction reversed, principal prosecution witness committed perjury); Mesarosh v.
United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1952) (conviction reversed, principal witness committed per-
jury in several instances); Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942) (denial of rehearing
on writ of error corum nobis affirmed, where proof of perjury inconclusive); United
States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974) (conviction reversed, government's chief
witness committed perjury before grand jury); United States v. Chisum, 436 F.2d 645
(9th Cir. 1971) (narcotics conviction reversed when narcotics agents, who-were princi-
pal witnesses, were convicted of perjury); United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.
1969) (robbery conviction reversed, newly discovered evidence established that principal
government witness committed perjury); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir.
1958) (habeas corpus granted as to murder conviction when officers destroyed state-
ments given by defendants and perjured themselves by claiming that no such exculpatory
statements had been made); Gondron v. United States, 242 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1957)
(conviction reversed, government agreed that key witness testified falsely); Imbler v.
Cravens, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), a!fd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 865 (1970).
25. See generally Cohen, Police Perjury: An Interview with Marcus Garbus,
8 CRIM. L. BULL. 363 (1972); Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris
Search Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405; Sevilla,
The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN Dinco L. REv. 839 (1974); Com-
ment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo.
L.J. 507 (1971).
26. At present some courts require witnesses to undergo polygraph examinations
in noncriminal cases. See Pfaff, The Polygraph: An Invaluable Judicial Aid, 50
A.B.A.J. 1130 (1964). Judge Pfaff's experience is borne out by Ferguson, Polygraph
[Vol. 26
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uable to add to the administration of justice."27
The Method and Theory of Polygraphy
The polygraphy instrument is designed to monitor and measure
certain physiological responses of a person who is answering a set of
'yes" or "no" questions. The instrument produces an electromechan-
ical recording of uncontrollable physiological changes occasioned by the
internal stress caused by an examinee's conscious insincerity. A stand-
ard polygraph ordinarily delivers this information with total accuracy.28
The polygraph examiner's analysis of the physiological measurements
and other circumstances of the examination lead to his expert opinion
of whether the person answered the questions truthfully. 29
In United States v. Ridling,30 Judge Joiner provided a comprehen-
sive description of the theory of polygraphy. Based on the principle
that the autonomic nervous system responds automatically, involun-
tarily, and uncontrollably to stress, the polygraph measures and records
these responses such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and sweat
gland activity. "A lie is an emergency to the psychological well being
of a person and causes stress. Attempts to deceive cause the sympa-
thetic branch of the autonomic nervous system to react and cause bodily
V. Outdated Precedent, 35 TExAs B.L 531 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ferguson]. See
also Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 71 SAN DINGo L. REV. 839, 873-
74 (1974) (advocating use of test results at suppression hearings, to eliminate perjury).
Mr. Sevilla, a nationally recognized authority on polygraph evidence, has recently
published a guide to the introduction of such testimony at trial. Sevilla, Polygraph
Evidence: The Case for Admissibility and Suggestions for Introduction, 2 CRM. DE-
FENsE (April 1975).
27. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1384 (S.D. Cal.), affd, 470
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
28. The accuracy of the measurements themselves cannot be challenged if the in-
strument is working properly. However, the information is meaningless in isolation.
Given form and content by reference to a specific examination, the information on
physiological changes becomes a part of a system subject to error. See generally J. REm
& F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 1-10 (1966) [hereinafter cited as REID & INBAU].
29. The expert's opinion only goes to the veracity of the person's stated beliefs.
"Clearly, nothing in the entire technique can show the underlying empirical truth in the
sense of the facts occurring in the past; but only whether the person examined himself
believed his answers." C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 207, at 505 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMicK]. As described by one lawyer-polygrapher:
"The polygraph instrument does not detect lies in the strict sense at all. If it 'detects'
anything, it is the truth. Its application is quite narrow. The instrument does not be-
lieve or disbelieve as a juror must do. Its recordings only distinguish between the whole
truth and something less than the whole truth, and there its function ends as a diagnostic
aid. It cannot testify, but it can be used to provide the basis for expert opinion." Fer-
guson, supra note 26, at 536.
30. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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changes of such a magnitude that they can be measured and inter-
preted." 81
This theory has not won universal approval. In United States v.
DeBetham,32 Judge Thompson stated that it was relevant to admissibil-
ity that no conclusive findings could be made as to the underlying phys-
iological hypothesis of the polygraph." Moreover, "[t]he question of
* . .validity is an extremely complex issue which may never be fully
answerable."34  For that matter, however, there does not appear to be
general scientific acceptance of a theory to explain all the phenomena
of aspirin. But even though aspirin's theoretical underpinnings may
never be elucidated to the satisfaction of the scientific community, the
fact is that it works. So does the polygraph. 5
31. Id. at 92.
32. 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), af'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
33. 348 F. Supp. at 1281 (footnote omitted).
34. Barland & Raskin, Detection of Deception, in ELECTRODERMAL AcTvrrY IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 435 (W. Prokasy & D. Raskin eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Barland & Raskin].
35. See generally Santa, The Polygraph, in R. CiPEs, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECII-
NQuES ch. 66 (1974). Cleve Backster, director of an outstanding polygraph school in
New York and San Diego who had administered over 50,000 examinations and devel-
oped the "Backster Zone of Comparison Test," provided a thorough explanation of how
a polygraph operator actually conducts an examination, in his testimony at the court
martial of Captain E. Medina. See C. ZIMMERMAN, THE POLYGRAPH IN CouRT 17-18
(1972) [hereinafter cited as POLYGRAPH IN COURT].
Backster explains that the first step in conducting a polygraph test is a "pre-exami-
nation reliability estimate" to determine whether the operator has adequate case informa-
tion and thereby "distinctness of issue." If this hurdle is passed, the operator will then
start to construct test questions. First, he must formulate at least two "relevant ques-
tions," which are very direct and pointed to the central "target" issue; "nonambiguous
questions . . . where semantics is quite an issue. . . so that the person taking the test
will understand the question." To assure that the subject understands the questions he
is encouraged to become involved in their formulation; they are read to him, and he
is asked to explain them.
The next stop is the formulation of "control" or "probable lie" questions. These
are in a category similar to the "relevant questions," but must not "in any way usurp
or detract from the reaction to the relevant question if the person were attempting de-
ception"; the control questions are then placed close to the relevant questions in the test-
ing structure. These questions are not directed at the subject matter of the examination
and permit the examiner to compare the reactions of examinee. Then a series of "neu-
tral questions," or those of which the examiner feels certain of the answer (as, "Is your
first name John?") are selected, to be used "merely to orient the individual taking the
test to any question being asked regardless of the type."
All of the questions are then carefully reviewed with the subject, again to insure
comprehension and pertinence to the examination; "under no circumstances is a question
injected into the testing" that has not been reviewed. This policy of avoiding surprise
is directed toward the elimination of the subject's fear that some other incident will be
raised, which might undermine the reliability of the responses to the relevant questions.
Although the exact working of the questions is known to the examinee, the actual order
[Vol. 26
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Summary of Salient Developments in Polygraphy and
the Admissibility of Test Results
Chronologically, the significant advances in the quest for a scien-
tific credibility evaluation assistance system, including the admissibility
in evidence of the system's expert opinion output, may be summarized
as follows:
1. In 1895, a pioneering criminologist, Cesare Lambroso, used
a device known as a "hydrosphygmograph" as a means of testing the
truth of statements made by criminal subjects. The instrument re-
corded changes in blood pressure and pulse patterns.30
2. In 1923, the results of a systolic blood pressure measurement,
correctly indicating that a suspect had told the truth when he denied
his guilt, were excluded from evidence because the expert did not per-
form the test in the presence of the court while the defendant was testi-
fying.3 7  In upholding the trial court's discretion, the court of appeals
set forth the infamous "general acceptance" standard for the admissibil-
ity of polygraph evidence: -the opinion testimony would be admissible
only if the scientific technique or device was sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field.3
3. In 1938, expert opinion testimony -that a person had told the
truth was admitted upon a foundational showing of validity of results
based upon a device which measured psychogalvanic skin response.39
in which they will be asked is not revealed.
The test is then administered, at least twice and usually three or four times "in
order to have a consistency . . . as far as the presence of or a lack of reaction on the
relevant questions." Backster's system involves a numerical scoring method with "at
least 18 separate opportunities to determine truth or deception during the procedure."
This technique prevents a distortion of the test result by any potential extraneous reac-
tion to a single question. The charts are interpreted by the examiner, and the result
is "a reading that would have to fall into three possibilities.. .that in the opinion of
the examiner, the person was being deceptive, that they were being truthful, or that the
test was inconclusive." Id.
36. REm & INBAU, supra note 28, at 1-2. See generally id. at 1-10. Prof. Fred
Inbau, outspoken proponent on behalf of law enforcement, has been called "possibly
the foremost authority on the subject" of truth detection. People v. Davis, 343 Mich.
348, 370, 72 N.W.2d 269, 281 (1955).
37. But see McComm-cK, supra note 29, at 505: "No one could reasonably con-
tend that the [polygraph] test should be conducted in the courtroom at the trial."
38. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The setting of Frye
is taken not from the two-page reported opinion, but from Ferguson, supra note 26. Al-
though Frye is the first reported opinion, the initial instance of use of the blood pres-
sure method of truth detection in a court of law appears to have been in Los Angeles
in 1913. See 3A J. WIGMORE, A TREAUSE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Evi-
DENCE IN TRLts AT COMMON IAW § 999, at 949 n.3 (Chadboum rev. 1970).
39. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1938). The Kenny foundation consisted of testimony from a person who chaired a uni-
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4. In 1948, a truth determination system of unknown compo-
nents served to convict a man of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child,
and the admissibility of expert opinion testimony was sustained on ap-
peal.4 °
5. At least since 1954, the California Supreme Court has con-
sistently recognized the admissibility of expert opinion testimony on
matters such as character traits, including credibility, even under rather
bizarre circumstances. 41
6. In 1957, Justice Traynor of -the California Supreme Court in-
dicated that polygraph evidence did not yet have sufficient reliability
to warrant admissibility.42
versity psychology department, held a degree in philosophy and a doctorate in physics,
had been a professor of physiology, and was also a priest. Judge Colden credited his
claim of 6,000 examinations and nearly perfect interpretations of truth. The same year,
the New York Court of Appeals refused to accept polygraph testimony, but understand-
ably so because unlike Kenny, the "record [was] devoid of evidence tending to show
a general scientific recognition that the pathometer possesses efficacy." People v. Forte,
279 N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938); see Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test
and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711, 716-17 (1953). Moreover, Kenny
manifested a surprising prescience in accepting an opinion based solely on skin
responses during questioning. In the field of psycho-physiology it has recently been ob-
served: "It is a well-established fact that measures of electrodermal activity can discrim-
inate between truth and deception at levels far beyond chance." Barland & Raskin,
supra note 34, at 420.
40. People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 691, 694-95, 193 P.2d 937, 940, 942
(1948). The Houser court focused on a stipulation that the expert opinion could be ad-
mitted into evidence. See Note, 15 ALA. L. REv. 248, 255 (1962). See notes 176-89
& accompanying text infra. Cases have drawn "a valid distinction in admitting poly-
graph evidence only pursuant to stipulations" according to State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App.
62, 68, 497 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1972), but the nature of the distinction is not intimated.
See Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 33, 35-40 (C.D. Cal. 1966), afrd, 396
F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1968).
41. See, e.g., People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 198-200, 443 P.2d 794, 802-03,
70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 218-19, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968) (abuse of discretion to
exclude psychiatric evidence as to emotional and mental status of complaining witness
for purposes of impeaching credibility); Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 101,
338 P.2d 447, 448 (1959) (mandate to compel in-custody examination by hypnotist re-
gardless of whether evidence ultimately is deemed admissible; expertise established;
method recognized by medical authorities); People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 600-01,
335 P.2d 114, 121-22 (1959) (error to exclude expert opinion as to sanity formed while
patient under influence of sodium-pentothal); People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26,
266 P.2d 38, 43 (1954) (expert opinion based upon sodium-pentothal interview admis-
sible not to prove facts asserted but for analysis of character). See also McCoRMIcK,
supra note 29, at 510.
42. People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 752, 312 P.2d 665, 674 (1957). The Carter
court held, inter alia, that it was error for a witness to testify to his willingness to clear
himself of suspicion through a polygraph examination, thus implying that the defendant
had not been willing to take such a test. Although the tests had sufficient probative
value to garner a conviction in People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937
(1948), the Carter dictum preferred the approach of People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.
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7. In 1966, the United States Supreme Court suggested that -the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would save an in-
dividual from compelled testing which might determine "guilt or inno-
cence on the basis of physiological responses." 43
8. In 1969, a federal appellate court recognized the advanced
state of the polygraph system for assisting in the truth determination
process. The court intimated that expert opinion testimony based upon
polygraph evidence should be received if a proper evidentiary founda-
tion was presented.4"
9. In 1972, three federal district courts4 found a scientific sys-
tem for credibility determination sufficiently reliable to be the basis for
expert opinion testimony. The system consisted, in part, of a device
which measured physiological responses to questioning, including: (1)
psychogalvanic skin response; (2) blood pressure; (3) pulse rate; and
(4) respiration rate.46  Moreover, a federal appellate court intimated
2d 124, 126-28, 219 P.2d 70, 71-72 (1950) (apparently coerced polygraph examination
without any foundation concerning polygraph's reliability; the court's understanding is
indicated by its calling a four-measurement polygraph a systolic blood pressure device),
and People v. Porter, 99 Cal. App. 2d 506, 510, 222 P.2d 151, 154 (1950) (in-chambers
request at conclusion of testimony for the court to provide a polygraph examination for
defendant; record devoid of reference to the state of the science of polygraphy). It ap-
pears that no reported California appellate case involving a polygraphy issue has had
the benefit of any evidence or findings as to the reliability and validity of the procedure.
See, e.g., People v. Schiers, 19 Cal. App. 3d 102, 108-13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 330, 333-34
(1971). With the abandonment of the appeal in People v. Cutler, no California appel-
late court to date has been presented with a factual record from which the court could
properly determine whether or not polygraph test results should be admissible; however,
an appeal is now pending in People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los
Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974), which presents a complete factual record estab-
lishing the validity and reliability of a properly administered polygraph examination.
See notes 65-69 and accompanying text infra.
43. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966); see Bowen v. Eyman, 324
F. Supp. 339, 341 (D. Ariz. 1970); Note, Constitutional Law: Supreme Court Deline-
ates the Relationship Between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 1967 DuKE L.J. 366,
381.
44. United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 802-03 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). Quoting Wigmore, Chief Judge Murrah suggested the con-
dition that "an expert testify 'that the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession
and that it has a reasonable measure of precision in its indications."' 413 F.2d at 802.
See also Wainwright v. United States, 448 F.2d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The orig-
inal failure to establish a foundation appears to be an evidentiary problem already de-
cided and not a constitutional question.").
45. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich.
1972); United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), af 'd, 470 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
46. See notes 54-61, 76-75 & accompanying text infra. On the measurements of
polygraph instruments, see Rnm & INBAU, supra note 28, at 3-4. Another noteworthy
decision is United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), where Judge Judd
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that trial courts have discretion to admit polygraph test results. 47
10. In 1972, a Los Angeles superior court found that, inter alia,
appellate decisions should be reexamined in light of the fact that the
polygraph technique enjoys general acceptance among psychologists,
physiologists, and polygraphers as a reliable procedure for detecting de-
ception and that, in view of the recognized accuracy "in excess of
90% ," the proffered polygraph evidence should be admitted. s
11. In 1973, a federal district judge in San Diego relied upon
polygraph test results in granting a judgment of acquittal after a jury
verdict of guilty;49 and the California Senate, after extensive hearings,
passed a bill which would permit polygraph test results to be introduced
into evidence in judicial proceedings.50
12. In 1974, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts en-
couraged trial judges to exercise their discretion in admitting polygraph
test results.51 Although -the court refused to hold that polygraph evi-
dence is always admissible, or to enumerate specific minimum guide-
lines for admissibility, the opinion strongly indicates an affirmative ap-
proach to the problem by directing the trial courts to fairly and care-
fully exercise their discretion as to whether or not polygraph test results
should be permitted in court. Similarly, but without encouraging the
trial judges to admit the evidence, Chief Judge Chambers of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit commented: "We told
the trial courts that they have the discretion to admit polygraph evi-
dence.""2
found that the government was required to disclose to the defense all relevant material
concerning a pretrial polygraph examination which had indicated the key government
witness was not telling the whole truth. Curiously Hart thwarted a defense effort to
submit polygraphic evidence under the dubious authority of United States v. Bando, 244
F.2d 833, 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 (1957). In Bando, one paragraph
is devoted to expressing agreement with the trial court that there is a difference of
opinion as to the scientific validity of the polygraph technique, and that scientists and
people in general do not believe that polygraphy is reliable. This utterly erroneous con-
clusion, propounded without any evidentiary presentation in the trial court, was ex-
pressed by the court of appeals, without citation, and now serves as precedent to preclude
probative evidence from district court consideration.
47. United States v. DeBetham, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 907 (1973).
48. People v. Cutler, No. A176965 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. Nov. 6,
1972), 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2133 (1972).
49. United States v. Gonzalez, No. 13089 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (Enright, J.).
50. S.B. 119 (1973). The bill to amend the California Evidence Code was passed
in the senate on May 9, 1973, but was not reported out of committee in the assembly.
51. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
52. Statement at Oral Argument, Mar. 4, 1974, United States v. Covarrubias, No.
73-3242 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 1974).
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Reliability of the Polygraph Technique 3
Judicial Recognition of Reliability
In United States v. DeBetham,5" the court considered the admissi-
bility of a polygraph examination in a nonjury trial where the defendant
was accused of knowingly transporting five grams of heroin. Defendant
offered to introduce the results of a polygraph examination which es-
tablished that he had no knowledge that the heroin was in his auto-
mobile. Although the trial court, apparently exercising its discretion,
declined to admit the test results, if analyzed the polygraph field in
depth, and found that the technique was extremely accurate if con-
ducted by a competent examiner: "'mhe most important factor
involved in the use of any [polygraph] is the ability, experience, educa-
tion and integrity of the examiner himself.' ,1 In reviewing the ex-
tensive evidentiary presentation, the court noted that "the field of in-
stnnental lie detection has.. . achieved the status of a department
of systematized knowledge that is currently being enriched through fur-
ther investigation and research." 56
The court went on to observe that it had considered testimony,
which was essentially undisputed, that the polygraph test had a high
53. For a summary of numerous scientific experiments establishing the validity
and reliability of polygraphs, see notes 76-88, 214-23 & accompanying text infra.
54. 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.) (Thompson, J.), affd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 90 (1973).
55. 348 F. Supp. at 1385, quoting Rum & INBAu, supra note 28, at 4 (brackets
in original).
56. 348 F. Supp. at 1384. See also POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 23-
24 (testimony of Cleve Backster):
[Q:] "[Clan [you] tell the court anything about the development in the past 20
years in the field of polygraph examinations that might have a bearing on the wisdom
of using such information in an evidentiary capacity?"
[A:] "The primary task was that of trying to combine and consolidate the various
techniques in the field into a more or less standardized polygraph technique. And I
think as far as the evolvement of polygraph technique is concerned, there has been a
fantastic evolvement. In other words, the test technique originally involved just a rele-
vant question. You just asked the person if they did it, whatever it was, and there was
not skillful use of -any control procedure whatsoever and this went through a number
of years in the polygraph. And then, in fact, through the introduction of the Reid Con-
trol. . . we started to really enhance the validity of the polygraph by having a compari-
son of the person's capability of reaction located very close by the relevant question
being asked during the polygraph procedure. And I would say that the validity in poly-
graph really rose to fantastic heights with the introduction of this one factor. And since
then we've gone to a great extent . . . toward standardization so that one examiner
can read another examiner's charts. . . . Where we are utilizing standardized forms
to where even through telephonic communication we know what the other examiner is
speaking of. And my personal stress has been that this standardization has been very
necessary to enhance professionalization of the polygraph and raise the reliability of it."
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degree of accuracy when conducted by competent examiners under the
proper conditions, and was estimated to have 90 percent accuracy with
less than 1 percent error by reputable experts who based their statistics
upon actual examinations in the field.57
Of the authorities cited by the court the most well known were
Mr. Reid and Mr. Inbau. In their book Truth and Deception, they re-
versed their opinion of thirteen years before that polygraph evidence
should not be admissible. With the improvement of the polygraphic
art, by 1966 their studies indicated that polygraph testing was 95 per-
cent accurate with less than 1 percent error, 5 percent of the subjects
not being capable of diagnosis because of psychological or physiological
handicaps.5" The court also considered the testimony of an army of-
ficer who had been director of criminal records of the Central Intelli-
gence Division since 1965. He testified that during his entire career
as an army polygraph operator, he was aware of only two persons who
had "passed" the polygraph who were subsequently prosecuted. 59
The DeBetham court concluded that if field studies "even . ..
actually approximate the accuracy achieved in the controlled experi-
ments, between 80 and 90 per cent, the reliability of polygraph can
fairly be termed 'substantial,' thus warranting a finding of probative
worth."60
[T]he -truly qualified polygraph examiner can eliminate or prevent
test errors arising from an unfit subject or improper examination
conditions . . . . [S]uch an examiner's qualifications can be
adequately tested through examination and cross-examination with-
out unduly consuming the court's time .... [T]he Court is satis-
fied that sufficient safeguards exist to preclude significant impair-
ment of the technique's reliability.61
57. 348 F. Supp. at 1384-85; see POLYGRAPH IN COuRT, supra note 35, at 23 (testi-
mony of Cleve Backster). Mr. Backster testified that he could recall only one or two
instances, out of the thousands of examinations run by himself or under his supervision,
in which the examiner's opinion as to the truthfulness or deception of the subject was
later demonstrated to have been erroneous. He characterized these as "isolated exam-
ples, but fortunately they're far enough back ...."
58. REID & INBAU, supra note 28, cited in United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp.
1377, 1384-85 (C.D. Cal. 1973). A number of authorities have reached similar conclu-
sions as to the highly accurate results of a properly administered polygraph examination.
See, e.g., ARTHUR & CAPUTO, INTERROGATION FOR INVESTIGATION 214 (1959) (1%
error); Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 TENN. L.
REV. 728, 729 (1953) (3% error); Pfaff, The Polygraph: An Invaluable Judicial Aid,
50 A.B.A.J. 1130, 1132 (1964) (1% error); Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and
the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711, 713 (1953) (2-5% error); Note, The
Polygraph and Probation, 9 IDAHO L. REv. 74, 76 (1972) (5% error).
59. 348 F. Supp. at 1389.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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While affirming the district court's exercise of discretion in refus-
ing to admit the test results, the appellate court observed that, "simply
stated, the evidence at the [district court] hearing vigorously supports
the accuracy of polygraphic evidence. '62
The Los Angeles Superior Court has also recognized the accuracy
of the polygraph technique. In People v. Cutler,63 the court admitted
polygraph evidence offered by a defendant at a motion to suppress, and
made several specific findings as to the accuracy of the science of
polygraphy after approximately seven days of evidentiary hearings.
These included findings that:
[T]he science of polygraphy including, the developing of more
sophisticated polygraph machines; the development of standards of
procedures in pre-examination interviews; the elimination of un-
suitable subjects; the programming of relative and control ques-
tions; the training and developing of qualifications for examiners
has been the subject of great and significant advancement in the
last ten years.
.. . [R]ecent laboratory and in the field research has estab-
lished a generally recognized reliability and validity of the poly-
graph in excess of 90 percent.
... [T]he polygraph now enjoys general acceptance among
authorities. . . and possesses a high degree of reliability and valid-
ity as an effective instrument and procedure for detecting decep-
tion.
.. . [M]any defense and security agents of the United States
Government determine whether charges and court martials will be
filed or prosecuted on the basis of polygraph examination.
• .. [S]everal law enforcement agencies in California uni-
formly refuse to file complaints or informations when no deception
is shown in polygraph examinations of suspects . . . 4
The Cutler case suffered a strange -fate, which hopefully will be
rectified through the appeal now pending from another California deci-
sion, People v. Adams.65 Although the district attorney in Cutler orig-
inally intended to appeal the trial court decision, after more than a
year's delay he abandoned the appeal, 66 ostensibly because of a fear
that the admissibility issue would not be squarely faced in -the case,67
but most likely in order to avoid establishing binding appellate prece-
62. 470 F.2d at 1368.
63. No. A176965 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. Nov. 6, 1972), 12 Crim.
L. Rptr. 2133 (1972).
64. Id., 12 Crim. L. Rptr. at 2134 (emphasis added).
65. No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974).
For other California cases involving polygraph admissibility, see note 42 supra.
66. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Jan. 2, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
67. Id.
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dent for admissibility.68 Therefore, he precluded the possibility of
creating a basis for judicial notice of foundation evidence and dispens-
ing with the need for an extensive foundational showing in each case.
Of course the prosecutor was aware that his actions perpetuated the
present inability of most defendants to utilize polygraph evidence due
to lack of funds, time and ability to present the necessary foundation
evidence. According to -the trial judge, the district attorney's decision
was "a cop-out." 69
Adams, on the other hand, may well determine the law concerning
admissibility of polygraph evidence in California. In order to avoid the
fate of Cutler, the trial judge placed -the issue directly before the ap-
pellate court by making every factual and policy finding necessary for
admission, concluding that he believed the test results should be ad-
mitted, but denying the motion to admit the evidence. The question
of admissibility will be presented on appeal based upon a record which
is highly favorable to defendant, but in such a manner that the district
attorney cannot avoid resolution of the matter through procedural ma-
neuvers.
Outside California, two federal district courts have also recog-
nized the polygraph's high degree of accuracy. In United States v. Zei-
ger,70 the defendant produced extensive testimony to establish a foun-
dation for -the in-court opinion evidence of a police officer who had ad-
ministered a polygraph examination. 71 The court found that:
68. The author was given this information by a "confidential, reliable informant,"
whose identity he is not free to reveal.
69. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Jan. 2, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
70. 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
71. Numerous expert witnesses testified, including John Reid. Reid's study in con-
junction with Frank Horvath, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth
and Deception, 62 J. CGuM. L.C. & P.S. 276 (1971), and book with Fred Inbau, REID
& INEAu, supra note 28, had been relied upon by the district court in United States v.
DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1381, 1385 (S.D. Cal. 1972). Lynn Marcy, a polygraph
examiner with 15 years experience, stated that of the 30% of these 8,000 cases where
the conclusions of his examination were subject to some form of verification (e.g., sub-
sequent confession, admission, or other evidence), he was aware of only six errors. The
accuracy of the polygraph technique was well over 90%. 350 F. Supp. at 689-90.
Martin Orne, a respected polygraph authority and professor of psychology and psy-
chiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, supposedly testified in support of the govern-
ment's contention that the polygraph results should be excluded; however, he admitted
that, according to his research and experience, the polygraph accuracy rate was 85%
or higher. Id. at 689. David Raskin, professor of psychology at University of Utah
and researcher in psychophysiology, testified that his laboratory experiments, though
considerably less accurate than field examinations, still had an accuracy rate of approxi-
mately 82%. id. Even the government's expert testified that the accuracy of polygraph
was vastly better than chance. Id. at 687 n.7.
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[t]oday, polygraphy has emerged from that twilight zone into an
established field of science and technology .... Its extensive use
by law enforcement agencies, governmental security organizations,
and private industry throughout the country is testimony to the un-
deniable efficacy of the technique.
The testimony of the experts and the studies appear-
ing in the exhibits lead the Court to believe that the polygraph
is an effective instrument for detecting deception. The fail-
ure of the Government to demonstrate significant disagreement
with this basic proposition, the absence of statistical data pointing
to any other conclusions, and the accepted and widespread absorp-
tion of the polygraph into the operations of many governmental
agencies, all confirm the Court's conclusion that the polygraph has
been accepted by authorities in the field as being capable of pro-
ducing highly probative evidence in a court of law when properly
used by competent, experienced examiners. 72
In United States v. Ridling,73 the court held that polygraph evi-
dence, which it regarded as opinion testimony, 74 would be admissible
in the pending perjury trial and recognized the reliability of -the poly-
graph technique: "The evidence in this ease indicates that the tech-
niques of the examination and the machines used are constantly im-
proving and have improved markedly in the past ten years."75
Scientific Evidence of Accuracy
Several recent studies, including some relied upon in the cases dis-
cussed above, have been conducted in an attempt to assess the reliabil-
ity and the validity of polygraph charts and interpretations. Validity
is the degree to which a test predicts or measures accurately that which
it is supposed to predict or measure; reliability refers to the degree to
which a test consistently yields the same results regardless of the ac-
72. 350 F. Supp. at 690. The appellate court's reversal in Zeiger cannot be con-
sidered a statement that polygraph evidence is inadmissible, given the factual set-
ting of the appeal. After the district court issued its opinion, a procedure allowing
expedited appeals in "emergency cases" was invoked (D.C. CoDE ANN. fit. 23, § 104(d)
(1970)), resulting in relatively incomplete and hurried appellate briefs. Apparently feel-
ing that such a significant issue should not be decided in the small amount of time (48
hours) afforded by the expedited procedure, the circuit court reversed without comment
or opinion, believing it would have a more full and complete record after the case pro-
ceeded to trial. However, the defendant was acquitted of all charges, and the case never
returned to the court of appeals. Personal communication with Frederick Barnett, at-
torney in Zeiger, in November, 1972. Mr. Barnett is a partner with F. Lee Bailey, in
the Boston firm of Bailey, Alch & Gillis.
73. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
74. Id. at 93.
75. Id. at 94. For a thorough discussion of applicable case law and scientific in-
formation which lead to the conclusion that the polygraph is highly accurate, see Note,
The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 COLUM. L. Rndv. 1120 (1973).
February 1975] POLYGRAPH
curacy of the predictions. In order for a test to be valid it must be
reliable; however, the converse is not true, for results can be entirely
consistent without predicting anything.
Although tests administered in the laboratory are far less accurate
than those involving an actual crime, Gordon H. Barland and David C.
Raskin of the University of Utah conducted an experiment in which
they administered polygraph examinations to seventy-two subjects, half
of whom were participants in a mock crime situation.76 The subjects,
whose "crime" was theft of ten dollars, were told they could keep the
money if they could successfully avoid detection. Three separate
charts were recorded on each of the subjects and the relevant responses
were scored on a continuum ranging from negative 3 (deception) to
positive 3 (nondeception).
The charts were submitted to five polygraphers from the army's
military school of polygraphy in Fort Gordon, Georgia. These exam-
iners knew nothing about -the individual subjects. Equipped only with
the polygrams and the wording of the questions, each examiner scored
the responses of the subjects for each physiological indicator, and the
scores were then compared. Comparative analysis of the data revealed
an average correlation of .86. 77 Out of the 559 cases where two exam-
iners both reached some decision about a subject's truthfulness, they
agreed 534 -times, or approximately 95.5 percent.
A number of published studies have reported accuracy of field
polygraph examinations in excess of 92 percent. 78 A recent article by
Bersh79 discusses what is probably the most extensive and thorough
study published to date, conducted under the supervision of Robert Bri-
sentine for the Department of Defense. A panel of experienced mili-
tary criminal lawyers were given the complete file on each case, with
the polygraph results removed. Each attorney independently deter-
mined the guilt or innocence of each defendant based upon the avail-
able evidence and ignoring "legal -technicalities." When all four panel
76. Barland & Raskin, An Evaluation of Field Techniques in Detection of Decep-
tion, in PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY (1975).
77. This figure, known as the correlation coefficient, is a mathematical derivation
used to ascertain the relationship between any two variables. (Plus or minus 1.00 mean-
ing perfect correlation and 0.00 meaning no relationship at all).
78. Kubis, Experimental and Statistical Factors in the Diagnosis of Consciously
Suppressed Affective Experience, 6 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 12, 14 (1950); Mac Nitt, In De-
fense of the Electrodermal Response and Cardiac Amplitude as Measures of Deception,
33 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 266, 271 (1942); Summers, Science Can Get the Confession,
8 FORDHAM L. REv. 334, 340 (1939).
79. Bersh, A Validation Study of Polygraph Examiner Judgments, 53 J. A'PLIED
PSYCH. 399 (1969).
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members were in agreement as to guilt or innocence of a defendant,
the decision of the polygraph examiner was the same as that of the
panel in 92.4 percent of the cases.
These results reported by Bersh have been confirmed in Gordon
Barland's doctoral research.80 Using examinations of criminal sus-
pects, Barland reported that the polygraph results were in agreement
with the independent judicial outcomes in 90.9 percent of the cases.
Therefore, the available evidence indicates that when the judgments
of judicial outcomes by a panel of expert attorneys are used as a cri-
terion of guilt or innocence the polygraph decisions are in very high
agreement and can be used as an accurate prediction of trial verdicts.
In another study, conducted by John Reid and Frank Horvath,"1
polygraph examination charts were selected from twenty-five actual
criminal investigations wherein the truth had been ascertained from
fully corroborated confessions of the guilty subjects. Of the seventy-
five examinations administered in the cases, thirty-five were considered
rather dramatically indicative of truth or deception to a fully qualified
examiner. The remaining forty presented a serious challenge to even
the best polygraphers. To assess the examiner's expertise in this highly
difficult exercise in chart interpretation, the polygrams and a summary
of the nature of the investigation were submitted to seven experienced
examiners and three inexperienced examiners. The examiners were
not advised of the -age or sex of the subjects, nor the content of the
questions asked; however, they were told where the relevant questions
were located on the charts. The trio of inexperienced polygraphers
attained an average of more than 79 percent correct judgments. The
seven examiners who had more than six months experience achieved
an average of more than 91 percent correct judgments in the detection
of truth and deception."2
In addition to experiments indicating the reliability and validity 3
of polygraphy, and the extreme difficulty of "beating" the test under
80. G. Barland, Detection of Deception in Criminal Suspects, 1975 (unpublished
doctoral dissertation in University of Utah Library).
81. Reid & Horvath, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth
and Deception, 62 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 276 (1971).
82. See also Blum & Osterloh, The Polygraph Examination as a Means for Detect-
ing Truth and Falsehood in Stories Presented by Police Informants, 59 J. CGlM. L.C.
& P.S. 133, 136-37 (1968), describing a study in which the examiner managed correctly
to identify 102 of 106 critical statements as true or false from a group not renowned
for veracity-underground informants.
83. See also Lykken, The GSR in a Detection of Guilt, 43 J. APPLIED PsYcH. 385-
88 (1959), wherein a 93.9% correct classifications rate was recorded in an experiment
involving mock crimes and a test based on galvanic skin response (GSR).
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a variety of circumstances,"4 studies have confirmed the underlying
theory of polygraphy: the relationship of measureable physiological
responses to the psychological process of deception. 5  Experiments
have revealed higher levels of detection where the subject is questioned
about matters which have personal significance 6 (as opposed to ma-
terial relevant only in the experimental context), and where the subject
has a high motivation to avoid detection.8 7  Such studies are highly sig-
nificant in that they indicate an even higher level of polygraph accuracy
in the "field," where the subject has a high motivation to avoid de-
tection8s and possesses personal knowledge of guilt, than in the mock
laboratory situation.
84. See, e.g., Lykken, The Validity of the Guilty Knowledge Technique: The Ef-
fects of Faking, 44 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 258 (1960) (Twenty subjects, including psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists, and medical students were given training in the theory of the galvanic
skin response (GSR) method, and were allowed to practice producing false responses.
The subjects were then offered ten dollars if they could "beat" the test; correct classifi-
cations were achieved in 100% of these cases using objective scoring of the GSR results
alone.); Davidson, Validity of the Guilty Knowledge Technique: The Effects of Moti-
vation, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 62 (1968) (using polygraph recording of GSR and the
guilty knowledge technique in a simulated crime context, with motivation for deceiving
the examiner ($25-50) for half of the crimes and low (10¢-$1) for the other half,
correct classification was achieved in 92% of "guilty" subjects and 100% of "innocent"
subjects.)
85. See, e.g., Gustafson & Orne, The Effects of Verbal Responses on the Labora-
tory Detection of Deception, in 2:1 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 10, 13 (1965), describing
a study resulting in a determination that having the subject verbally "lie" by means of
a "no" response produced the highest detection rate; this is currently the procedure used
in most laboratory studies, and most field examinations utilize questions phrased so that
the subject must say "no" to avoid incrimination. The Gustafson-Orne experiments
demonstrated that "psychological variables are the basic determinant of the alterations
in physiological response upon which the detection of deception is based." It is interest-
ing to note that this confirmation of the underlying theory of polygraphy was produced
by, inter alia, M. T. Orne, a government witness in United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp.
685, 689 (D.D.C. 1972).
86. See Thackray & Orne, Effects of the Type of Stimulus Employed and the Level
of Subject Awareness on the Detection of Deception, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 234 (1968).
This study also attempted to provide exploratory data concerning the physiological re-
sponsivity of lie detection stimuli when the subjects were unaware that their responses
were being monitored. While there was no evidence that detection was inferior under
the "not-aware" condition, difficulties in achieving a completely convincing situation of
unawareness suggest caution in generalizing from these findings.
87. See Gustafson & Orne, Effects of Heightened Motivation on the Detection of
Deception, 47 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 408 (1963). GSR responses were recorded for two
groups, one "motivated to deceive the operator and withhold responses" and the other
given no special instructions. Subjects who were motivated to deceive were more readily
detected, as they more frequently produced "disproportionately large skin responses to
critical as opposed to non-critical items. .. "
88. See also Barland & Raskin, supra note 34.
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The Legal Rationale for Admission of Polygraph Test Results
Expert Opinion Evidence Affecting Credibility
The testimony of an expert polygraph examiner consists of his
opinion as to whether the subject of the examination was telling the
truth or something less than the whole truth when answering the test
questions. Of course, the expert is testifying as to the truth of the sub-
ject's stated beliefs; i.e., as to whether -the subject believed that his an-
swers were true, rather than as to the actual empirical veracity of those
answers. 89  After carefully arranged and supervised questioning, the
polygraph recordings of emotional activity must be interpreted by the
expert examiner "and that interpretation is stated in the form of an
opinion.
In federal court, pursuant to rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, "[tihe trial court has considerable discretion as to mat-
ters of opinion."'" The guidelines for admitting an expert's opinion
are clear: "A witness who by education and experience has become
an expert in an art, science or profession may state his opinion as to
a matter in which he is versed and which is material to the case, and
he may also state his reasons for such opinion."92  The standard for
appellate review is also well established: "'Tihe qualifications of an
89. See note 29 supra.
90. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The ambit
of allowable opinion was sketched by the Iowa Supreme Court: "The polygraph exam-
iner properly qualified as an expert should be permitted to explain the nature of the tests
given, state the questions asked and answers given, the reactions thereto as indicated by
the equipment and his opinion as to defendant's telling the truth when answering the
specific questions. The witness should not be asked nor permitted to answer directly
that defendant was involved in the [crime]. If defendant was involved in the [crime]
in this case he was... guilty. An expert, testifying to a hypothetical question or as
to tests made may not go that far." State v. Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 1969).
91. 3 L. ORmLD, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL Rur.ns 518 (1966).
See also Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370, 377 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 969 (1964).
As of July 1, 1975, Article VET, Rules 701-05 of the new Rules of Evidence for
United States Courts and Magistrates (reproduced in 43 U.S.L.W. 137, 140-41 (Jan. 14,
1975)) will govern evidentiary matters relating to opinion and expert testimony in fed-
eral courts. However, these new rules will not in any manner affect nor alter the analy-
sis in the text.
92. Holm v. United States, 325 F.2d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1963) (opinion based upon
handwriting analysis). See also, e.g., Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970) (ballistics expert's opinion that a bullet came
from a particular firearm); United States v. Sollberger, 411 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1969)
(chemist competent to testify to her conclusions); United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d
69, 74 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969) (secret service agent's testimony
that coins were counterfeit); State v. Spencer, 216 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1974) (expert
opinion based on neutron activation analysis that firing a weapon is indicated).
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expert are within the purview and discretion of the trial judge.' Unless
the trial court's exercise of discretion is clearly erroneous, its decision
as to the qualifications of an expert witness should not be disturbed."9
In Lindsey v. United States,9 4 the Ninth Circuit recognized the
"increasing tendency to allow expert psychiatric opinion testimony as
to the credibility and character traits of a witness."95  Opinion testi-
mony on credibility was admitted, for example, in Hanger v. United
States,96 where a psychiatrist testified as to whether a person believed
a statement of events.97  When polygraph test results are offered, the
court is similarly presented with expert opinion testimony as to whether
a person believed a statement of events. United States v. Ridling
establishes that the trial judge has discretion to admit or exclude ex-
pert testimony based upon polygraph evidence subject only to the quali-
fication of the expert and relevancy of the testimony.9"
Scientific Evidence: General Rules
According to Professor Strong, the literature of evidence -tends "to
restrict the term scientific evidence to specific data obtained by scien-
tific means and to treat evidence whereby general propositions of sci-
ence are furnished and applied under the head of expert -testimony."99
93. Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
943 (1970).
94. 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956).
95. Id. at 897 (citations omitted).
96. 398 F.2d 91, 106 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1119 (1969).
97. The expert was asked whether there was a reliable way to determine when the
defendant was telling the truth, and he responded that "there exists no 'black and white
test' and that it 'is strictly a matter of judgment and experience of the examiner who
questions the person.'" 398 F.2d at 106. The court further explained that such testi-
mony did not usurp the function of the jury: "In this case, Dr. Alderete expressed his
opinion as to whether Riley believed the statement given him when Riley made it. This
is far short of Dr. Alderete expressing his expert opinion that he believed Riley's state-
ment, or that Dr. Alderete believed the defendants guilty in accordance with Riley's
statement." Id. Another court explained that the trial judge's discretion to admit opin-
ion evidence as to credibility "must rest for the most part on the court's judgment as
to whether an emotional or mental condition is involved which a body of laymen either
would be unable to detect or would be unable to relate in terms of effect to the matter
of credibility." People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 195, 443 P.2d 794, 900, 70 Cal. Rptr.
210, 216, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968). This is the precise analysis for admission
of expert opinion based upon polygraph evidence. See, e.g., Strong, Questions Affecting
the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 11 [hereinafter cited as
Strong].
98. 350 F. Supp. at 93.
99. Strong, supra note 97, at 5. The demarcation line is said to be artificial, con-
venient and sometimes violated in the interests of perspective on the process of admit-
ting scientific evidence. Id. at 5-6.
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Evidence of the results of polygraph examinations has been categorized
as scientific evidence. 100
Scientific evidence normally consists of scientific data to which
some general scientific proposition is applied in order to draw the con-
clusion for which the testimony is offered. 10' For example, ballistics
testimony usually consists of some shells upon which there are markings
(data) and testimony to the effect that no two bullets are marked
identically after firing and that by comparing the markings, shells can
be matched to the particular weapon from which -they were fired (gen-
eral principle). Assuming the expertise of the witness has been estab-
lished, he may then testify to his conclusion as to which weapon fired
the bullet. If that conclusion is relevant to the case (e.g., the victim
was wounded by a bullet which is matched to the gun found in defend-
ant's pocket), it will be admitted. Of course, if it is not judicially
noticed that no two bullets are marked exactly alike, a foundation for
this premise must be established or the expert's testimony is irrele-
vant.
0 2
[L]ike other propositions, scientific propositions may yield con-
clusions of varying value for the case. These may intrude to some
degree upon the "ultimate issues," and they may or may not be
obscured by some human tendency of the jury to apply some other
invalid proposition of its own to the basic data to reach an im-
proper and "prejudicial" conclusion. Each of these factors ought
to be considered with respect -to scientific evidence, and are within
the realm of judicial rather than scientific expertise. 10 3
Scientific Evidence: The Frye Standard Analyzed
At some point all new scientific principles presented in court have
been subjected to judicial scrutiny.'04 Few, however, have been held
100. McCoRMCK, supea note 29, at 504-07. But see United States v. Ridling, 350
F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ("'Mhe evidence in reality is opinion evidence.").
101. Strong, supra note 97, at 1-4.
102. Id. at 4, 14. See note 106 infra. If, e.g., it is not always true that no two
bullets are identical, the court should properly balance probative value against prejudice.
103. Id. at 14.
104. "[The officer] even stated positively that he knew that the bullet came out
of the barrel of that revolver, because the rifling marks on the bullet fitted into the
rifling of the revolver in question, and that the markings on that particular bullet were
peculiar, because they came clear up on the steel of the bullet. . . . The evidence of
this officer is clearly absurd, besides not being based on any known rule that would make
it admissible. If the real facts were brought out, it [sic] would undoubtedly show that
all Colt revolvers of the same model and the same caliber are rifled in precisely the
same manner, and the statement that one can know that a certain bullet was fired out
of a 32-caliber revolver, where there are hundreds and perhaps thousands of others rifled
in precisely the same manner and of precisely the same character, is preposterous."
People v. Berkman, 307 Ill. 492, 501-02, 139 N.E. 91, 94 (1923) (emphasis added).
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to the rigorous "general acceptance" standard established for poly-
graph-based opinion testimony in Frye v. United States,"0 5 a 1923 de-
cision by the District of Columbia Circuit: the opinion testimony would
be admissible only if the scientific technique or device (there, systolic
blood pressure measurement) was generally accepted in the particular
scientific field involved. 106 Courts considering the admissibility of
most types of scientific evidence have only required that the scientific
principles supporting the expert testimony be established as reliable
enough to insure acceptably probative results.10 7
105. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
106. Strong, supra note 97, at 11-13. Professor Strong suggests that the few areas
of scientific evidence held to the more rigorous Frye standard have one or more of these
characteristics in common: (1) they are not readily assignable to any branch of science
when first offered; (2) they rely on a mechanical device or chemical process; (3) they
deal with "ultimate issues" in some sense; and (4) the proposition is articulated as
"probably such and such" as opposed, e.g., to "bullet markings are always different"
107. The apparent judicial hostility toward the polygraph, evidenced by the determi-
nation of admissibility by more stringent standards than other scientific evidence, was
recognized in Note, The Polygraphic Technique: A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L.
REv. 330, 336-37 (1971), and in C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvrDENcE
§ 170, at 363 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK HANDBOOK]:
"We face at the outset the question, to what extent must the device, technique or
theory be shown to have won scientific acceptance before the results or conclusions
based thereon can be used in evidence? The court which first faced the question of the
admissibility of the results of a 'lie-detector' examination announced as the test whether
the supporting theory had gained general acceptance among 'psychological and physio-
logical authorities.' The court held that this test was not met and rejected the evidence,
and this particular kind of evidence has been rejected with like reasoning by other courts
ever since. By contrast, another court quite recently, considering the admissibility of
the results of the use of the Harger breath test for measuring intoxication seemingly re-
jected this criterion of general scientific acceptance, and said: 'Dr. Beerstecher [a bio-
chemist] testified that the instrument in question is accurate and he gave his reasons
for it. He admitted that there are others who disagree with its accuracy. The objection
to his testimony, therefore, goes to its weight and not to its admissibility.'
"It seems that the practice approved in the second case is the one followed in re-
spect to expert testimony and scientific evidence generally. 'General scientific accept-
ance' is a proper condition upon the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but
not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence." The differential treatment
of the admissibility of polygraph test results supports the conclusion that the Frye stand-
ard is really a device by which many jurists conceal their subjective beliefs that the poly-
graph will replace the jury system. See, e.g., United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp.
278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 372, 72 N.W.2d 269, 282
(1955). It may be explained by their reluctance to admit any scientific device which
is not primarily an aid to the prosecution. Cf., e.g., Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613,
616 (Fla. 1972) (Mager, J., concurring specially); People v. Bobczyk, 343 I1. App. 504,
509, 99 N.E.2d 567, 570 (1951) (court emphasized need for test in law enforcement,
admitting drunkometer results).
Some of the recent voiceprint cases are illustrative of judicial readiness to admit
a notoriously unreliable form of evidence because it is helpful to the prosecution. Some
courts, however, have refused to admit voiceprint evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (overruling admission of voiceprint evidence
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If the question of the admissibility of polygraph test results were
determined by the "aid to the jury" or "reliable enough to be proba-
tive" standards applied to most scientific evidence, polygraph evidence
would clearly be admissible.' 08  Perhaps, as the high accuracy of the
polygraph technique is repeatedly established in courts, the emphasis
on "general acceptance" will diminish; this may be particularly true in-
in United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972)); People v. law, 40 Cal.
App. 3d 69 (1974); People v. Chapter, 13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2479 (Super. Ct. Marin
County, Cal. 1973). See also Jones, Danger-Voiceprints Ahdad, 11 AM. CRuM. L.
REv. 549 (1973). In Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr.
547 (1973), the court alluded to the Frye "general acceptance" standard, but admitted
the voiceprint evidence by holding that, although the technique was not generally ac-
cepted, the term "experts" was to apply only to those in the field who could be "expected
to be familiar with its use." Id. at 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 553. In the case of voice-
prints, this amounted to less than a half-dozen persons out of thousands of acoustics ex-
perts. Based on a single set of experiments performed by the key prosecution witness,
Dr. Tosi, who claimed that they established that the technique has less than 6% error,
the court determined that the process was reliable enough to have probative value and
admitted the evidence. The three other major voiceprint decisions do not even mention
the Frye standard. United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967)
(reliability and accuracy of results based on testimony of Dr. Kersta, developer of test,
whose testimony was rejected in People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr.
478 (1968)); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1972) (accuracy based on Dr. Tosi's
experiments); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 457-58, 192 N.W.2d 432,
441 (1971) (reliability based on Dr. Tosi's experiments; any disagreement with Dr.
Tosi's results should go to weight, not admissibility). See also Coppolino v. State, 223
So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (test developed by witness
for determining amount of poison in victim's body admitted despite witness's admission
that not sufficiently reliable for publication in a medical journal, and other experts' testi-
mony that they believed such a test was not possible; court, without mentioning Frye
criteria, noted broad discretion in trial court as to reliability and admissibility of scien-
tific evidence, and stated proper standard for review was whether scientific test was "so
unreliable and scientifically unacceptable that [its] admission into evidence was error");
Henson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 647, 655-56, 266 S.W.2d 864, 869 (1953) (admission
of "paraffin" test for gun shot residue on hands upheld because test not so "inherently
unreliable"); People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 511, 99 N.E.2d 567, 570 (1951)
(chemical tests for intoxication admitted; lack of uniformity of scientific opinion goes
to weight, not admissibility); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 435-41 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (wide discretion in trial court in determining
whether state of technology warrants admission of expert testimony; despite newness of
technique of neutron activation analysis and lack of unanimity among experts as to con-
clusiveness of results; general acceptance "in the particular field in which it belongs"
satisfied essentially by existence of four scientists who devoted the bulk of their time
to development of the process).
108. The underlying principle that measurable physiological changes accompanying
deception can be recorded by polygraph and interpreted by a competent examiner to a
greater than 90% accuracy has been established. See notes 58-82 & accompanying text
supra. Some courts are at last conceding, moreover, that polygraph evidence should be
held to the same standard of "probative value" as other types of scientific evidence. See,
e.g., United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), af Id, 470 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973); People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Al-
hambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974).
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sofar as general rules of evidence regarding expert testimony can pro-
tect against the concerns which underlie -the Frye doctrine'0 9 while not
denying to juries what is unquestionably probative and extremely help-
ful evidence. 110
The Frye". court ruled that the evidence in question had been
properly excluded by the district court because "the systolic blood pres-
sure deception test [had] not yet gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would
justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the dis-
covery, development, and experiments thus far made.""12
The district court in United States v. DeBetham" 3 suggested that
this language was the actual holding of the Frye case,"' and that it
provides a clear basis for distinguishing polygraph evidence today from
that presented in Frye."' Therefore Frye merely held that a specific
device, the systolic blood pressure test, was not yet admissible. Com-
pared to a current credibility evaluation assistance system, such as the
five-measurement polygraph," -the process before the Frye court
(which measured only blood pressure) was a primitive tool. It was
no more a forerunner of modern polygraphy than was alchemy the
dawn of neurosurgery." 7
In spite of the narrow holding in Frye, dozens of tribunals have
refused to admit polygraph test results by relying instead on the lan-
guage in Frye:
[Wihile Courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
-the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs." 8
109. Strong, supra note 97, at 14-15.
110. "Probativeness" can, of course, properly be weighed against "the familiar dan-
gers of misleading the jury, unfair surprise and undue consumption of time." McCoR-
MICK HANDBOOK, supra note 107, at 363-64.
111. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See notes 37-38 supra.
112. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
113. 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
114. Id. at 1379.
115. Id. at 1382-84.
116. See notes 30-35 & accompanying text supra.
117. LAw-MEDIcINE RESEARCH TNsTrrJTE, SclmNrMIc INVESTIGATON IN CRIMNAL
JUSTIcE 14-15 (1969).
118. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). But see United States v. DeBetham, 348
F. Supp. 1377, 1383 n.15 (S.D. Cal. 1972) ("It seems then that it is only subsequent
opinions that have read into Frye a more special purpose.").
As part of its holding, the district court in DeBetham found that polygraphy did
not meet the Frye "general acceptability" test. Id. at 1381-82. However, the DeBetham
court appears to have read the Frye "general acceptance" requirement far too literally,
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Even assuming that "general acceptance" governs the admissibility of
scientific evidence, 119 polygraphy would now satisfy that requirement.
Judicial Notice
Scientific testimony usually involves a general scientific principle
and specific data or evidence to which that principle is applied by an
expert in order to reach a conclusion relevant to the issues of the par-
ticular case.120 The validity of the principles underlying such techniques
as handwriting analysis, fingerprinting, and ballistics are so universally
recognized that a court may take judicial notice of them and eliminate
the necessity of establishing a foundation through expert testimony.
Professors McCormick' 2' and Strong12 2 have both noted that al-
though the general acceptance standard is appropriate in determining
whether a court shall take judicial notice of scientific assertions, 2 3 it
is not a proper criterion for evaluating the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Failure to meet the Frye test of general acceptance should not
preclude admission of polygraph evidence per se, but should only re-
by demanding not only widespread acceptance of the technique and its use throughout
the various scientific communities involved, but also "general acceptance" of the underly-
ing scientific theory. Thus, DeBetham requires not only that all knowledgeable parties
agree that the system works and actually employ it in fact, but further that they agree
as to why the technique works. It is submitted that validity of a process is demonstrated
not by the reasons why it works, but rather by the correlation between a particular event
and certain desired effects. See notes 34-35 & accompanying text supra.
119. The Frye opinion has not enjoyed much repute among legal analysts who can-
not find an acceptable rationale for its departure from normal evidentiary standards for
the admission of scientific evidence. See notes 104-10 & accompanying text supra. See
Strong, supra note 97, at 14. See also United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 511
(D. Md. 1973) ('Thus rather than putting the issue in terms of 'general acceptance
within a particular field' and engaging in an academic dispute as to the particular field
in which polygraphy fits, the Court chooses to assess the progress of polygraphy by
drawing on contributions from those engaged both in theory and practice.").
120. See notes 101-03 & accompanying text supra.
121. McCoRM=cK HANDBOOK, supra note 107, at 363.
122. Strong, supra note 97, at 9 ("Even if judicial notice is not taken of the validity
of a general proposition of science, that validity may still be established by an appropri-
ate evidentiary showing by expert testimony."). See also Kaplan, The Lie Detector:
An Analysis of its Place in the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 381, 386 (1964).
123. It is arguable that after the opinion of the appellate court in United States
v. DeBetham, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), which recognized the reliability of poly-
graphs while upholding the discretion to exclude it, courts in the Ninth Circuit should
take judicial notice of the validity of the polygraph technique. This interpretation is
supported by the recent opinion in United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111 (9th Cir.
1973), which indicated that the trial court, which seems to have been presented with
no evidentiary foundation, nonetheless had full discretion to admit or reject the poly-
graph evidence; such discretion would only seem possible under the circumstances in Al-
varez if the validity of the technique were judicially noticed. See also Ridling v. United
States, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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quire the proponent of the evidence to present satisfactory expert testi-
mony as to the technique's validity.
Frye in 1975: Reinterpreting "General Acceptance" in the "Particular
Field"
Current case law establishes that only the opinions of polygraphers
and those studying polygraphs (rather -than psychologists and physio-
logists as suggested by Frye) should be considered in determining the
general acceptance of polygraph evidence. For example, in Lindsey
v. United States,124 the Ninth Circuit invoked Frye for the requirement
of "'general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,'"
and then proceeded to define the "particular field" (use of sodium-
pentothal) to consist of experts in "narcoanalysis." There was no sug-
gestion of any need for general acceptance by medical doctors, psychia-
trists, or psychologists.
Huntingdon v. Crowley,125 involving the admissibility of a new
blood grouping technique, applied a similarly restrictive approach.
The California Supreme Court did not inquire into the technique's ac-
ceptance within the "particular field" of medical practitioners, nor even
medical blood specialists. Rather, the court looked to the experts who
might aid its determination: 126 those in the highly specialized field of
"disputed paternity testing.' 127  The court further stressed that the
question of whether a scientific technique has, at any given point in
time, gained general acceptance in its particular field is primarily a
question of fact to be determined by the trial court.'28
Under this increasing restriction by courts of "particular field" to
knowledgeable specialists, the proper inquiry is not whether polygraphy
124. 237 F.2d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1956).
125. 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1966).
126. Compare People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958),
where the issue was admissibility of Nalline test results, and the particular field was sim-
ilarly limited: "It has been generally accepted by those who would be expected to be
familiar with its use. In this age of specialization more should not be required." Id.
at 862, 331 P.2d at 254.
127. 64 Cal. 2d 647, 6-56, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1966); cf.
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971) (general acceptance in field of neutron activation analysis shown essentially by
four scientists who devoted substantial amount of their time to the field); Hodo v. Su-
perior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 770, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973) (experts in voiceprint
field limited to those "who could be expected to be familiar with the technique," totaling
less than a half-dozen); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970) (field consisted of one toxicologist).
128. 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1966); Hodo
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 784-85, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547, 550 (1973); People
v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 443, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482 (1968).
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(much less its underlying theory) has gained general acceptance
among physiologists and psychologists, as suggested in Frye;12 9 rather,
it is whether there is general acceptance of the technique by experts
in polygraphy. Considering the restrictive definitions applied to other
fields, and the requisite level of "general acceptance," the expert
polygrapher certainly has cause for wonder. If the issue involves
sodium pentothal the answer may be supplied by an expert narco-
analyst. Paternity blood testing is a particular field. One toxicologist
can establish acceptance for his idea. If four physicists develop a
specialty, they attain general acceptance in their own field. 130 It is dif-
ficult to explain to an expert polygrapher that polygraphy is somehow
not a field of its own, but depends upon what psychologists and physio-
logists -think of the state of polygraph technology on any given day.
"General Acceptance" as "General Use"
Twenty-three years after Frye, -the District of Columbia Circuit
Court was called upon to interpret the standard it had articulated in
that case. In Medley v. United States, 3' the defendant had been ar-
rested in possession of a revolver, bullets, and a fingernail file. The
noses of the bullets had been scraped in a manner quite similar to that
of bullets which had caused the death of a Mr. Boyer. Expert testi-
mony, based upon a process known as "spectroscopy," indicated that
the fingernail file "contained particles from the metal of a cartridge."' 32
The introduction of this testimony was objected to on the ground that
the technique was "so little known as to lack the degree of certainty
justifying its use as evidence in a criminal case." However, the court
ruled that it was "easily demonstrable that [spectroscopy] is now in
general use in scientific research and industrial analysis. There is
nothing in the testimony which in any respect conflicts with the rule
applied by 'us in Frye v. United States. . . ."183 Logically and legally,
this "general use" analysis of Frye seems appropriate. Logically, a
principle which is widely used in decisionmaking by ,those concerned
with practical results, such as industry and governmental agencies, 84
129. The court in People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles
County, Cal. May 14, 1974), asserted that even this stricter standard has been achieved,
with "in excess of 70% of physiologists and psychologists generally accept[ing] the
proposition that [polygraph] recordings can be accurately interpreted."
130. See note 127 supra.
131. 155 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 873 (1946).
132. Id. at 860.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 61 (testimony of Clayborne
A. Lowry, criminal investigator, U.S. Army 1951-1968 & instructor, Fort Gordon School
of Polygraph, that he could not recall a single case in the military in which a man was
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can be assumed to be valid and reliable. Legally, the language in Frye
that "[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages . . . as would justify
the court in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development and experiments thus far made,"' 5 seems to distinguish
between experimentation and development, and actual demonstrable
application.
Thus, a scientific theory upon which only a handful of people are
conducting scientific experiments is not sufficiently established to war-
rant admissibility. This was the case with the systolic blood pressure
technique in 1923. On the other hand, a theory which has developed
past the experimental stage to "general use" in science or industry
should be admissible in court. Since spectroscopy met this general use
standard it was properly admitted in Medley; the foundation was ap-
parently established by the court's notice of two publications on the
subject.'8 "
Under these "general use' guidelines, polygraphy clearly meets
the "general acceptance" requirement of Frye. The widespread use
of, and reliance upon, the polygraph by both private industry and gov-
ernment agencies was recognized by the district courts in both De-
Betham and Zeiger:
[T]he Court was especially impressed with the evidence of wide-
spread acceptance that the polygraph has received among federal
and state law enforcement agencies, who apparently rely upon the
technique in their day-to-day prosecutorial decision making.'3 7
[E]xtensive use by law enforcement agencies, governmental secu-
rity organizations, and private industry throughout the country is
testimony to the undeniable efficacy of the technique. 138
formally prosecuted after having been judged by a polygraph examiner to be telling the
truth); id. at 77-78 (testimony of Robert Brisentine, chief polygraph advisor to the com-
manding officer, U.S. Army CID Agencies, to the same effect).
135. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).
136. To support its finding of "general use," the court merely cited the 1936 publi-
cation of a work entitled Spectroscopy in Science and Industry and the 1938 records of
Proceedings of the Fifth Summer Conference on Spectroscopy and its Applications.
Medley v. United States, 155 F.2d 857, 860 n.4 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 873
(1946).
137. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1389 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
138. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C. 1972).
It is interesting to note the reliance of public officials on polygraphs when accused
of impropriety. When Frank Rizzo, mayor of Philadelphia, was accused by a Demo-
cratic Party leader of offering to let him choose architectural firms for lucrative city
projects in exchange for letting Rizzo pick the party's district attorney candidate, and
the mayor flatly denied the allegation, a local newspaper proposed that both men take
lie detector tests. Rizzo not only agreed, he proclaimed, "'I have great confidence in
the polygraph. If it says a man lied, he lied.' That was indeed what the polygraph
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Similarly, the trial court in the recent California case of People v.
Adams emphasized the widespread public and private use of polygraph
testing and concluded defendant's foundation evidence was
sufficient to show that the Frye test of general acceptance has been
met with respect to polygraph evidence testimony, not only among
polygraph operators, physiologists, and psychologists, but also
among investigatory agencies, generally. 139
"General Acceptance" as "Reliable Enough to Have
Probative Value"
In United States v. Zeiger, the court observed:
[A]ceeptance of the polygraph can be meaningfully determined
only with respect to a particular purpose to which the device is used
and the degree of reliability required for that purpose. . .. For
the purpose here at issue, Frye requires such acceptance and recog-
nition "as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony"
deduced from a polygraph examination. The general criterion re-
quired for the admission of evidence is its relevance or tendency
to prove a material fact.140  "[If evidence is logically probative,
it should be received unless there is some distinct ground for re-
fusing to hear it.' 41 And so Frye has been interpreted to demand
general acceptance among the experts that current polygraph tech-
niques possess a degree of reliability which satisfies the court of its
probative value.' 42
This interpretation of Frye's "general acceptance" would appear close
to the traditional standard for the admission of scientific evidence. 4 '
said: Rizzo flunked six key questions." NEwSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1973, at 91 (emphasis
added).
Similarly, former Lt. Governor Reinecke of California submitted to two days of
polygraph testing in conjunction with charges of perjury stemming from the ITr affair.
Though initially expressing his confidence that the tests would "clear me of any wrong-
doing" (Los Angeles Times, Mar. 15, 1974, at 1), his confidence waned after he claimed
the tests proved "inconclusive," and stated that, "I don't think there is a question of pass-
ing or flunking .... You are either reactive or not reactive." Id., Apr. 6, 1974, at
1. The absurdity of Reinecke's assertion that he was just "a very reactive person" to
the polygraph technique is apparent. See note 35 supra.
Even Los Angeles District Attorney Joe Busch, who has analogized the polygraph
to "twentieth century witchcraft" when admissibility in court was suggested (Los An-
geles Daily Journal, Jan. 2, 1974 at 1), immediately offered to take a polygraph when
accused of election improprieties.
139. No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974).
140. See 1 J. WIGMoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLo-AmERIcAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRuALS AT COMMON LAW § 10 (3d ed. 1940). See notes 101-03 & accompany-
ing text supra.
141. McComcK, supra note 29, at 433. Being "logically probative" would seem
the equivalent of "possessing efficacy." People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 517, 255
N.E.2d 696, 699-700 (1969).
142. 350 F. Supp. 685, 687-88 (D.D.C. 1972) (footnotes are author's; court's foot-
notes omitted).
143. See notes 107-08 & accompanying text supra.
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The evidence is overwhelming that the results of polygraphy are
vastly more reliable than 51 percent' 44 and would "render the desired
inference more probable than it would have been without the evi-
dence."'14 3 This should satisfy even those who want "reasonable cer-
tainty"'I4 for fear that, with less probity, the prejudicial nature of the
polygraph would be too overwhelming.
Use of Polygraph Evidence in Court
Pre-1972 Cases
With the exception of three state cases,147 no pre-1972 court con-
sidered the question of admissibility of polygraph evidence at trial in
the context of an evidentiary hearing to establish the reliability of the
technique as a foundation for an informed decision.1 48  Professor Mc-
Cormick correctly observed that in all of these jurisdictions a court
could have admitted polygraph test results had a proper evidentiary
foundation been established. 49 An analysis of the three pre-1972
144. See notes 58-60, 76-82 & accompanying text supra, and notes 214-23 & ac-
companying text infra.
145. McCoRMICK, supra note 29, at 437.
146. People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938).
147. People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); People v. Leone, 25
N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969); People v. Kenny, 167 Misc.
51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1938).
148. This was recognized as to federal cases by the district courts in United States
v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 687 nn.4-5 (D.D.C. 1972), and United States v. DeBetham,
348 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 nn.1, 3 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
As to the state cases, see, e.g., People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 343 P.2d 577
(1959); People v. York, 174 Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (1959); People v. Woch-
nick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950); People v. Boney, 28 Ill. 2d 505, 192
N.E.2d 920 (1963); Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d 540 (1972); State v. Lowry,
163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503
(1942); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952); Hawkins v. State,
224 Miss. 309, 77 So. 2d 263 (1955); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43
(1945); State v. Hollywood, 138 Mont. 561, 358 P.2d 437 (1960); Parker v. State, 164
Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593
(1949); State v. Emery, 27 N.J. 348, 142 A.2d 874 (1958); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938); State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); Looper
v. State, 381 P.2d 1018 (Okla. Crim. 1963); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45,
230 P.2d 495 (1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Hunter v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 448,
169 A.2d 347 (1961); Grant v. State, 213 Tenn. 440, 374 S.W.2d 391 (1964); Placker
v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 406, 350 S.W.2d 546 (1961); Davis v. State, 165 Tex. Crim.
456, 308 S.W.2d 880 (1958); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
149. "Many courts can easily recede from this position [excluding polygraphs] in
a case where the foregoing facts as to acceptance and reliability are adequately proven
by the expert himself as a foundation for his testimony giving the test-results." McCoR-
MICK HANDBOOK, supra note 107, § 174, at 372.
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state cases which did hear foundational evidence supports this conclu-
sion."' o
Post-1972 Cases
The general trend in the cases decided since 1972 has been to
recognize that polygraph evidence may be admitted on a case-by-case
basis if a proper foundation has been established. 151 The following
language in United States v. Wainwright precipitated the shift away
from per se exclusion of polygraph testimony:
[N]o judgment can be made without relevant expert testimony re-
lating ,to the probative value of such evidence. Wainwright totally
failed to supply the condition noted by Wigmore that before such
evidence be admitted an expert testify "that the proposed test i
an accepted one in his profession and that it has a reasonable
measure of precision in its indications." The trial court properly
excluded [the polygraph evidence] even though in a proper case
it may be admissible. 152
150. In People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1938), results of a form of polygraph known as a "pathometer" were admitted based
upon a foundation established by Father Summers. See note 39 supra. When no foun-
dation was proffered, the court in People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31,
32 (1938), upheld the rejection of defendant's offer to take a pathometer test after con-
clusion of the evidence, stating "we cannot take judicial notice that the instrument is
or is not effective for the purpose of determining the truth."
In People v. Leone, the court recognized that polygraph evidence could be admitted
upon presentation of proper foundation, but found that the showing in the instant case
was inadequate as it did not indicate "a general scientific recognition that the polygraph
possesses efficacy." 25 N.Y.2d 511, 517, 255 N.E.2d 696, 699, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434
(1969). The court emphasized that the polygrapher involved had been unable to reach
any legally meaningful conclusions. Id. at 517, 255 N.E.2d at 699-700, 307 N.Y.S.2d
at 434. The decision in Leone has, however, been limited to its facts and time period.
People v. McCains, 42 App. Div. 2d 866, 867, 347 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74 (1973) (court im-
plicitly recognized increased acceptance of polygraphy since Leone); Walther v. O'Con-
nell, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 317-19, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387-89 (Civ. Ct. Queens City 1972)
(court admitted polygraph results as it would expert testimony in civil case, distinguish-
ing Leone on the ground that the court in that case had dealt with an inexperienced
polygraph examiner; apparently without foundational showing, court in effect took judi-
cial notice of reliability of polygraph, and stated that in light of this reliability, previous
legal precedents based on unreliability were not binding).
Finally, in People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 372, 72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (1955), the
court found that, although the foundational testimony was "noteworthy and valuable,"
it was insufficient in view of the "tremendous weight" such evidence would carry. How-
ever, the court's distrust of polygraphy was substantially based on the opinion of Profes-
sor Inbau. Id. at 370, 72 N.W.2d at 281. Inbau has since changed this opinion to favor
admissibility of polygraph evidence. See note 58 & accompanying text supra.
151. There is some uncertainty as to whether this foundation must demonstrate
probative value or general acceptance. Compare notes 107-08 & accompanying text
supra, with notes 106, 111-12 & accompanying text supra.
152. 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added), quoting 3 J. Wi6moRa,
EVIDENCE § 990 (3d ed. 1940).
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Since Wainwright, numerous courts have either admitted polygraph evi-
dence at trial after an adequate foundation had been established in an
evidentiary hearing, 15 or have recognized that such evidence can be
admitted when a proper foundation is established.154
153. See, e.g., United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1974) (sustaining
trial court's discretion in admitting polygraph results as to one count and not as to other
counts, and stating that under 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1970) the trial court can appropri-
ate funds for polygraph testing where defendant is indigent); United States v. Grasso,
CR-72-179-LC (D. Mass. June, 1973); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Dioguarti, Crim. No. 72-1102 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); People v. Richardson, No. A014598 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. Sept.
21, 1974) (after evidentiary hearing, court admitted polygraph test results and dismissed
prosecution); People v. Marshall, No. A128583 (Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal.
June 6, 1974) (preliminary hearing); People v. Harris, No. A294977 (Super. Ct. Los
Angeles County, Cal. June 26, 1973) (robbery conviction based on uncorroborated iden-
tification; new trial granted when defendant passed polygraph test); Stenzel v. B., 71
Misc. 2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Family Ct. Niagara City 1972) (results admissible
in paternity case); Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Civ. Ct.
Queens City 1972) (polygraph test results admissible in suit involving question of repay-
ment of loan).
Polygraph evidence has also been admitted at sentencing hearings. State v. Jones,
110 Ariz. 546, 521 P.2d 978 (1974); State v. Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 213, 278 A.2d
543 (1971) (admitted because of desire to have available all material that might be use-
ful at sentencing). Polygraph test results have been admitted at a hearing on a motion
to suppress evidence. United States v. Lucken, CR 74-958 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 1974)
(Thompson, J.) (the judge, who had presided over the trial in DeBetham, admitted the
polygraph results on the question of consent and proceeded to rule that the federal offi-
cers had testified falsely and the search was unlawful); People v. Cutler, No. A176965
(Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. Nov. 6, 1972), 12 CRIM. L. Rym. 2133 (1972).
154. United States v. Francis, 487 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94
S. Ct. 1615 (1974); United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd,
470 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973); United States
v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 30 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313
N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
Not surprisingly, in post-1972 cases where polygraph evidence was offered without
foundation, the court rejected the evidence. United States v. Francis, 487 F.2d 968 (5th
Cir. 1973) (sentencing hearing); United States v. Sockel, 478 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
920 (1973); People v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 523 P.2d 267, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467
(1974); State v. Jones, 281 So. 2d 220 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); Cagle v. State, 132 Ga.
App. 227, 207 S.E.2d 703 (1974); People v. Sanders, 56 Il. 2d 241, 306 N.E.2d 865,
cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3178 (1974); State v. Corbin, 285 So. 2d 234 (La. 1973); State
v. Mower, 314 A.2d 840 (Me. 1974); People v. Bush, 54 Mich. App. 77, 220 N.W.2d
333 (1974); State v. Turley, 521 P.2d 690 (Mont. 1974); State v. Atkinson, 191 Neb.
9, 213 N.W.2d 351 (1973); State v. Clark, 128 N.J. Super. 120, 319 A.2d 247 (App.
Div. 1974); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 75 Misc. 2d 823, 348 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Family
Ct. Rockland County 1973); Castleberry v. State, 522 P,2d 257 (Okla. Crim. App.
1974); State v. Woo, 527 P.2d 271, 273 (Wash. 1974) ("If we are to consider a depar-
ture from a virtually unanimous rule against the admissibility of polygraph examinations,
absent stipulation, we must be furnished with a record sufficiently adequate to permit
review of the subject."); State v. Nemoir, 62 Wis. 2d 206, 214 N.W.2d 297 (1974).
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The Ninth Circuit Cases
Decisions within the Ninth Circuit are illustrative of the trends and
problems in judicial treatment of admissibility of polygraph evidence.
In United States v. DeBetham,'55 the district court ruled that it could
not admit polygraph evidence because insufficient evidence had been
presented to meet the Frye "general acceptability" test,15 6 and -that in
any event two Ninth Circuit cases excluding polygraph evidence were
controlling.'5 T  Although the court was apparently willing to reread
Frye in light of the intervening years,', the Ninth Circuit precedent
appeared insurmountable: 'Were the Court writing on a clean slate,
the foregoing conclusions. . might well warrant a finding of admis-
sibility in the instant case . ... 59
On appeal, the circuit court held that the -two previous Ninth Cir-
cuit cases had not removed discretion from a federal court to admit
polygraph evidence under appropriate circumstances. 60 However, the
appellate court affirmed the conviction by concluding that due to the
discretionary nature of admissibility, "[d]espite the strong showing
made by appellant we are not ready to say that the trial judge abused
his discretion in rejecting the offer."'.' The court emphasized that it
In addition, in several post-1972 cases appellate courts rejected polygraph evidence
without any discussion of foundation evidence or any indication that foundation testi-
mony had been presented below. United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1974) (No. 73-1510); United States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d
969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 849 (1973); Flurry v. State, 289 So. 2d 632 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1973), cert. denied, 289 So. 2d 644 (Ala. 1974); People v. McVet, 287
N.E.2d 479 (IMI. 1972) (sentencing hearing); Robinson v. State, 309 N.E.2d 833 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1974); People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 211 N.W.2d 533 (1973) (sentenc-
ing hearing); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 309 A.2d 732 (Pa. 1973). But see State v.
Lucero, 86 N.M. 686, 526 P.2d 1091 (1974), overruling State v. Alderete, 86 N.M. 176,
521 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1974).
155. 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
156. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See notes 105-06, 111-
46 & accompanying text supra.
157. Cf. United States v. Salazar-Gaeta, 447 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Sadrzadeh, 440 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1971). It is hard to imagine why the dis-
trict court felt constrained by either case, since they were easily distinguishable because
no foundational showing of the accuracy of the technique had been presented; in fact,
the DeBetham trial court noted this by including Salazar-Gaeta and Sadrzadeh in a cita-
tion to all of the federal cases rejecting polygraph which had been decided without an
evidentiary hearing. 348 F. Supp. at 1379.
158. 348 F. Supp. at 1380, 1384. See note 118 supra.
159. 348 F. Supp. at 1391.
160. 470 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1972).
161. Id. (emphasis added); accord, United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111, 113
(9th Cir. 1973) ("In line with our decision in [DeBetham] we hold that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the offer of the polygraph evidence.").
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was not holding "that polygraphic evidence is never admissible.' 162
The appellate court totally distorted the record to affirm this con-
viction. Judge Thompson did not exercise his discretion to exclude the
test results, since he believed that the earlier Ninth Circuit decisions
precluded him from admitting the evidence. In fact, the trial record
establishes that he would have admitted the polygraph evidence if he
had believed that he had discretion to do so. On petition for rehearing,
however, the appellate court rejected the clearly appropriate approach
of remanding to the trial court to allow the judge actually to exercise
his discretion.
Unfortunately, the "admission within the trial court's discretion"
approach of DeBetham has often ben utilized to exclude polygraph
evidence at the whim of the trial court.163  Clearly, such arbitrary
action constitutes a complete failure to exercise discretion, which is of
course an abuse of discretion."" The trial court must weigh the con-
flicting interests, and should balance probative value against possible
prejudice;16  certainly the court must be governed by some standards.
It seems imperative that appellate courts set out factors to guide the
trial judges in exercising discretion.'06
162. 470 F.2d at 1368; cf. United States v. Covarrubias, No. 73-3242 (9th Cir.
Mar. 12, 1974) (during oral argument, Chief Judge Chambers, a member of the De-
Betham court, stated, "We told the trial courts they have discretion to admit polygraph
evidence."); United States v. Lucken, CR 74-958 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 1974) (Judge
Thompson, the trial judge in DeBetam admitted polygraph test results on question of
consent at hearing on motion to suppress and held the search was unlawful); United
States v. Gonzales, CR 13089 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (Enright, J.) (judgment of acquittal
based on polygraph results after jury verdict of guilty); United States v. Walker, No.
5108 (S.D. Cal. 1969) (after foundational evidence presented, polygraph evidence ad-
mitted on the question of compliance with knock and announcement requirements of 18
U.S.C. § 3109 (1970)).
In a rather curious decision, polygraph evidence was admitted at the voluntariness
hearing but Judge Hauk would not allow the evidence to go to the jury; the court of
appeals avoided the merits of the issue and affirmed the judgment of conviction. United
States v. Merrill, No. 74-2247 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1972).
163. The author's apprehension is based on such cases as United States v. Watts,
502 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1974), United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1973),
and extensive experience in other federal courts since DeBetham.
164. See, e.g., Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1968); People
v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 443 P.2d 794, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1968). "The discretion
intended, however, is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion,
guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles ...in conformity with
the spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends
of substantial justice." Id. at 194, 443 P.2d at 799, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 215, quoting Bailey
v. Taaffe, 29 Cal. 422, 424 (1866).
165. S.B. 119 (1973) specifically incorporates CAL. Evm. CODE § 352 (West 1966),
which utilizes just such a balancing approach to govern the trial court's discretion to
exclude evidence. For text of S.B. 119, see note 263 infra.
166. The Seventh Circuit has at least articulated a justification for upholding the
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Commonwealth v. A Juvenile
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recently taken a
cautious first step in this direction. In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,167
that court remanded on the ground "that the defendant's motions con-
cerning polygraph tests were not denied by the trial judge as a matter
of discretion but rather as a ruling of law."'168 While declining to "limit
the trial judge's discretion . ..by formulating strict minimum stand-
ards as prerequisites to qualification of polygraph experts,"' 69 and
asserting that "further learning, experimentation and experience are
necessary before more comprehensive and all encompassing rules are
considered for adoption,"' 70 the Massachusetts appellate court nonethe-
less emphasized the necessity of a true exercise of discretion by the
trial judge by setting forth certain guidelines:
[I]f a defendant agrees in advance to the admission of the results
of a polygraph test regardless of their outcome, the trial judge, after
a close and searching inquiry into the qualifications of the exam-
iner, the fitness of the defendant for such examination, and the
methods utilized in conducting the tests, may, in the proper exercise
of his discretion, admit the results . . . . As a prerequisite the
judge would first make sure that the defendant's constitutional
rights are fully protected. 171
Although refusing to rule that "at this time polygraph test results
should be generally admissible in evidence in criminal trials,' 172 the
trial court's discretion in denying authorization of funds under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(1970) for polygraph examinations as to several counts after authorizing such funds and
admitting the resulting test evidence on one count, by noting that there was substantial
evidence of defendant's guilt as to the counts on which the evidence was not admitted,
and that no exceptional circumstances were presented as to these other counts. United
States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 1974). Although the appellate court
failed to formulate any meaningful standards for the exercise of discretion, even this lim-
ited justification is a greater analysis than has yet been provided by the Ninth Circuit.
167. 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
168. Id. at 128.
169. Id. at 126.
170. Id. at 128.
171. Id. at 124.
172. Id. at 125. This policy decision by the court-to leave the admissibility ques-
tion within the discretion of the trial court, rather than to deem polygraph evidence
generally admissible-is based on two premises, neither of which is convincing. First,
the majority states that, "In sum, despite very significant progress in recent years, the
field of polygraphy is still challenged forcefully on theoretical grounds . . . ." Id.
However, the authorities and articles cited in support of this contention date from 1950
to 1962, certainly prior to many of the recent and significant developments in the field.
They are hardly persuasive as to the present state of the art. Secondly, the opinion as-
serts that "polygraphy. . .has yet to achieve a predictable level of consistency among
examiners." Id. As extensively discussed elsewhere in this article, numerous scientific
studies have shown polygraphy to be highly accurate, as has practical research. See
notes 57-82 & accompanying text supra, & notes 214-23 & accompanying text infra.
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Massachusetts court, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit, appears to be
actively encouraging trial judges to admit polygraph evidence in their
discretion after a defendant has consented to its use. The majority,
responding to the dissenting opinions, rejected the suggestion to refer
the entire polygraph dilemma to a commission for study:
[P]olygraphy has, for decades, been the subject of study, debate
and controversy. It is too late in the day for just another study.
Rather, the time is ripe for cautious judicial examination and eval-
uation . . . Actual testing in the courts is necessary before
[a decision as to rejection or acceptance of the concept] can be
made.173
Although the court might have at least indicated to the trial judges
some of the situations in which an exercise of discretion in favor of ad-
missibility would be appropriate," 4 the positive directive to proceed
reasonably and carefully with such an exercise of discretion is itself a
step. in this direction. Unfortunately, a great deal of future litigation
will be required to resolve the guidelines for determining how and
when -this discretion should be exercised.
It is implicit in the developing case law that regardless of the
standards set by a court, the key to admissibility of polygraph evidence
generally lies in the proponent attorney devoting the substantial amount
of time that is necessary to prepare and -present a sufficient foundation.
The failure to make such a painstaking effort, or incorrect tactical de-
cisions at the hearing, may not only result in inadmissibility in the im-
mediate case, but may also perpetuate the line of poorly considered
decisions rejecting polygraph testimony, thus foreclosing others from
The dispute is not whether the technique is accurate but whether the precise degree of
accuracy is 85 or 98%. "[C]onclusiveness is not the requirement for admissibility of
scientific evidence." United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970). While
it is true that the field of polygraphy, like other scientific fields, contains persons of
differing competency and experience, so that accuracy may vary depending on the ability
of the examiner, the Massachusetts court itself stresses the importance of the trial judge's
examination of the qualifications of the expert and strongly indicates its faith in the
judge's ability to make such an evaluation as a basis for exercising his discretion. 313
N.E.2d at 126, 129.
173. 313 N.E.2d at 129.
174. Similarly, situations in which the polygraph test results should properly be ex-
cluded might be indicated, as, for example, where two experts reach opposite conclusions,
so that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by undue consumption of time
or potential confusion of the issues. See note 165 supra & note 274 & accompanying
text injra. That this task is neither unique nor impossible is illustrated by Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in which the court set out com-
prehensive guidelines as to what factors trial courts should consider in exercising their
discretion to exclude or admit prior felony convictions offered by the government for
impeachment purposes; the practical utility of such standards is evident in the numerous
cases following Gordon that expressly relied on those guidelines.
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benefiting from the use of such evidence in the future.175
The Paradox of the Stipulation Cases
Even in jurisdictions where polygraph test results have been held
inadmissible, some courts have admitted the identical evidence under
the guise of a "stipulation."'176 However, at least one commentator has
175. For example, in United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363 (C.D. Cal.
1973), the court acknowledged that DeBetham permits the admission of polygraph evi-
dence under proper circumstances. However, Urquidez rejected the test results after an
evidentiary hearing, and held "that, as of now, the validity of a polygraphic test is de-
pendent upon a large number of variable factors ... difficult, and perhaps impossible,
to assess." Id. at 1367. This holding was relied upon in State v. Curtis, 281 So. 2d
514, 515 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), to justify exclusion.
It is submitted that the following factual circumstances, not apparent in the opinion
but based on the author's personal knowledge and an analysis of evidence at the hearing,
explain the Urquidez decision, and emphasize the manner in which bad precedent is es-
tablished: (1) The attorney presenting the case for admission of polygraph evidence
attempted a 30-day "crash course" on the subject, and simply had an insufficient knowl-
edge of polygraph evidence to present the motion properly or to make the correct stra-
tegic decisions. (2) For reasons still unclear, the Los Angeles federal public defender's
office, which was in charge of the case, refused help volunteered by more experienced
attorneys (specifically, counsel for DeBetham and Cutler). (3) The examiner who ad-
ministered the test was not highly experienced; he would not have qualified under the
proposed California Polygraph Bill. (4) The examiner's former employers testified at
the hearing that he had been fired by them because of his lack of competence. (5)
The test results themselves, when numerically evaluated, bordered on inconclusiveness,
and a knowledgeable practitioner would have concluded that this was not an appropriate
test case. (6) Because of his inexperience, the defense attorney consented to have his
client examined by a second (allegedly incompetent) examiner, who used no generally
recognized technique, who proceeded to testify for the government, contrary to the con-
clusions of the inexperienced defense examiner. Had the second examiner been ap-
pointed by the court or by stipulation of the parties from recognized, competent experts
in the community, as suggested by the court in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp.
90, 96-97, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972), and by the proposed California Polygraph Bill, this
conflict might have been avoided. In short, the circumstances of the Urquidez hearing
made it as poor a forum for presenting the case for polygraph as is imaginable.
176. See, e.g., Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966),
affd, 396 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1968); State v. Bush, 109 Ariz. 487, 512 P.2d 1221 (1973);
People v. Davis, 270 Cal. App. 2d 841, 76 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1969); People v. Houser,
85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); State v. Brown, 177 So. 2d 532 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1965); People v. Parisie, 7 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 287 N.E.2d 310 (1972); State v.
Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 1969); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d
825 (1964); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960); State v. Lowry,
163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968); State
v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972); State v. Lucero, 526 P.2d 1091 (N.M.
1974); State v. Bennett, 521 P.2d 31 (Ore. App. 1974); State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1974); State v. Stanislawksi, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974); cf. Jones
v. State, 527 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497
P.2d 1343 (1972). But see Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
As a practical matter, the practitioner should first have his client privately tested
before making any decision as to whether to enter into a stipulation. Many attorneys
have later regretted believing their client's false protestations of innocence after entering
into an irrevocable stipulation.
February 19751 POLYGRAPH
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
observed the paradox in this approach: "[B]y what logic should stip-
ulated polygraph evidence be admissible when the same evidence with-
out stipulation is barred?"177  While a stipulation may, of course, ad-
mit facts, "it is obviously inoperative"178 if it attempts to "'change the
law.' "179
An example of an acceptable stipulation is set forth in State v. Towns, 35 Ohio
App. 2d 237, 243-44, 301 N.E.2d 700, 705-06 (1973): "It is hereby agreed by and be-
tween counsel for the State of Ohio and counsel for the defendant. . . and by and be-
tween the aforementioned parties and the defendant, Joseph L. Towns, himself, that the
defendant will submit to a 'Polygraph Test' or tests, the subject matter being the homi-
cide of John Butler and robbery of Sandy's Drive-In Restaurant which occurred Decem-
ber the Tenth of Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-One at the location of 850 Mt. Vernon
Avenue in the City of Columbus, State of Ohio, to determine any knowledge or complic-
ity of the aforementioned offenses. The 'Polygraph Test or Tests' to be administered
by a person or persons duly qualified to administer such test(s) and acknowledged by
all parties to this agreement to be qualified to administer this test or these tests and
to testify at trial of this cause as an 'expert' or as 'experts' regarding all aspects of the
test(s) as given.
"It is further agreed among all parties that the 'results' of the polygraph test(s) or
examination(s), including the complete testimony of the person administering same to
the defendant, shall be offered and received as evidence in the trial of this cause without
objection of any kind by any party to this agreement. It is understood that the defend-
ant has been fully advised of his rights under the Ohio and United States Constitutions
prior to his agreeing to submit to such test(s) and knowingly and intelligently waives
his right to remain silent and his right to seek the advice of counsel during any stage
of the administration of the polygraph test(s) or examination(s).
"It is further understood by all parties that upon signing this entry of stipulation
of use of polygraph test(s) and results in evidence, all parties and their successors in
interest (i.e., such other counsel as the State of Ohio or the defendant may retain or
employ for any subsequent trial which may result through the investigation of the subject
matter of this cause) shall be mutually bound to the terms of said entry and the refusal
of any party to submit to any portion of said entry shall be subject to comment by the
other parties at any subsequent trial of this cause.
"It is also understood that the place and date of examination(s) of the defendant
will be arranged and designated by counsel for the State of Ohio. The 'expert' or 'ex-
perts' who will examine the defendant will be selected from the Columbus Police Depart-
ment and will be designated by counsel for the State of Ohio."
For the past ten years in Orange County, California, the district attorney's office
has had a standing policy that any defendant who wishes to take a polygraph test to
prove his innocence may take such an examination if he first stipulates to its admissibil-
ity at trial. As a practical matter no trial has ever been held after the test, since a
defendant will have his case dismissed if he passes, or will plead guilty if he fails.
Under this system, one case of a defendant accused of robbery was dismissed after a
polygraph examination established his innocence even though he was identified by 17
eyewitness to the robbery. See People v. Cutler, No. A176965 (Super. Ct. Los An-
geles County, Cal. Nov. 6, 1972), 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2133 (1972) (testimony of Fred
Martin, former chief polygrapher, Orange County District Attorney's Office).
177. Note, The Polygraphic Technique: A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REV.
330, 341-42 n.109 (1971).
178. Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917).
179. Los Angeles Ship Building & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 289 F.2d 222,
231 (9th Cir. 1961).
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Two positions have developed in response to this legal paradox.
One, asserting that "a stipulation for admission does not increase the
reliability of polygraph results,"'8s0 has logically resulted in holdings
that the evidence should be excluded regardless of a stipulation.' A
second response is represented by the rationale of State v. Valdez,18
2
and meets the stipulation paradox by taking the position that the poly-
graph has attained such a level of accuracy as to justify admission upon
stipulation." 3 However the distinction between "reliable enough for
a stipulation" and "reliable enough for trial" is simply not meaningful.
Cases admitting polygraph evidence on stipulation, like the cases ex-
cluding such evidence despite stipulation, recognize that it cannot be
180. Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alas. 1970).
181. See id.; accord, State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); Lewis
v. State, 500 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973). See also People v. Potts, 74 IlM. App. 2d 301, 220 N.E.2d
251 (1966) (holding that stipulation does not foreclose appellate review of admissibility
and finding that there had been inadequate inquiry into the test conditions and the ex-
aminer's qualifications).
182. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). The Valdez court adopted additional
safeguards for introduction of the polygraph evidence upon written stipulation of the par-
ties:
"(1) That the county attorney, defendant and his counsel all sign a written stipula-
tion providing for defendant's submission to the test and for the subsequent admission
at trial of the graphs and the examiner's opinion thereon on behalf of either defendant
or the state.
"(2) That notwithstanding the stipulation the admissibility of the test results is sub-
ject to the discretion of the trial judge, i.e. if the trial judge is not convinced that the
examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under proper conditions he may re-
fuse to accept such evidence.
"(3) That if the graphs and examiner's opinion are offered in evidence the oppos-
ing party shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner respecting:
"(a) the examiner's qualifications and training;
"(b) the conditions under which the test was administered;
"(c) the limitations of and possibilities for error in the technique of polygraphic
interrogation; and
"(d) at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deemed pertinent to the
inquiry.
"(4) That if such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury that
the examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime
.. . but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination defendant
was not telling the truth. Further, the jury members should be instructed that it is for
them to determine what corroborative weight and effect such testimony should be given."
id. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01.
183. See id.; State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974) (finding
of high accuracy of polygraph results was basis for abandoning 40-year old rule that
polygraph evidence was inadmissible even upon stipulation by the parties); cf. State v.
Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972). But see Gaddis v. State, 63 Wis. 2d
120, 216 N.W.2d 527 (1974) (excluding evidence of a court-ordered examination be-
cause there was no stipulation by the parties).
POLYGRAPH
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
logically argued that any "foundation" as to accuracy is achieved by
stipulation."" Therefore, when a court admits polygraph evidence
upon stipulation, it is probably because of a tacit belief in the accuracy
of the technique.
A plausible rationale for admission by stipulation is that a stipula-
tion at least expresses agreement of the parties to the competency of
the examiner.'8 8  Since the ability of the examiner is the single most
important variable affecting the accuracy of polygraph test results, such
a stipulation is an indirect assurance of accuracy. 8 6 Rather than take
this indirect approach, it would be better to recognize openly the ac-
curacy of polygraphy and to restrict testimony to those "experts" who
either (1) qualify for inclusion on a list of court appointed experts
recognized to be competent,18 1 (2) qualify under stringent state licens-
ing schemes, 88 or (3) meet the standards suggested by Reid and Inbau
for competent polygraph experts.8 9
184. See, e.g., State v. Trotter, 110 Ariz. 61, 514 P.2d 1249 (1973) (error for court
to fail to instruct, sua sponte, that the polygraph did not tend to prove or disprove any
element of the crime charged, but at most only indicated whether at the time of the
examination defendant was telling the truth).
185. Note, The Polygraphic Technique: A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REV.
330, 342 (1971), The courts are split on the issue of the enforceability of a stipulation.
In Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969), and State v. Davis, 188
So. 2d 24 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), enforcement of such an agreement between the
prosecutor and the defendant was required. In both of these cases, it appears that the
trial judge had approved the particular agreement involved. In State v. Sanchell, 191
Neb. 505, 216 N.W.2d 504 (1974), the court refused to enforce the agreement because
of the absence of trial court approval. It is submitted that this latter case is incorrectly
decided, and that agreements between prosecutor and defendant should be enforced in
order to protect the integrity of the judicial system. The district attorney and the de-
fendant should both be bound by the bargain into which they have entered. These three
cases illustrate, however, the advisability of having the court participate in any stipula-
tion agreement, or in having the agreement reduced to the form approved in State v.
Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962). See note 182 supra.
186. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (S.D. Cal. 1972); REI
& INBAU, supra note 28, at 4.
187. See, e.g., S.B. 119 § 898.3 (1973), as amended in Assembly Aug. 19, 1974.
For text of S.B. 119, see note 263 infra. See discussion in notes 276-79 & accompanying
text infra.
188. States which have passed legislation regulating polygraph examiners include
Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. H§ 71-2201 to -2225 (Supp. 1973)), Florida (FLA. STAT.
ANN. H9 493.40-.56 (1974-75 Supp.)), Georgia (GA. CoDE ANN. H9 84-5001 to -5016
(1970)), Illinois (ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, §H 202-1 to -30 (1973)), Kentucky (KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 329.010-.990 (1972)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. §H 73-29-1 to -47
(1972)), Nevada (NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 648.005-.210 (1973)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT.
§ 67-31A-1 to -11 (2d Repl. Vol. 10 1974)), North Dakota (N.D. CNT. CODE § 43-
31-01 to -17 (Supp. 1973)), Texas (TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 4413 (29 cc) (1974-75
Supp.)), and Virginia (VA. CODE § 54-729.01-.018 (1974 Repl. Vol. 7A)).
189. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
citing REID & INBAU, supra note 28, at 257. See note 248 infra.
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The Policy Objections to the Admission of Polygraph
Evidence: An Analysis and Response
Before analyzing the recent case of United States v. Wilson,190
which raises all of the "major" misconceptions which can be termed
objections to the admission of polygraph evidence, some of the rel-
atively "minor" objections to admissibility may be noted.
First, it is asserted that polygraph evidence could present circum-
stances which violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. This
spectre is hardly a realistic possibility: it is clear that a defendant can-
not be compelled to take a polygraph test,191 nor can a prosecutor com-
ment upon his failure or refusal to submit to such a test; case law re-
quires a reversal for constitutional error if either of these situations oc-
curs.
192
One potential problem, discussed in United States v. Ridling'93
and noted in the Adams9 case, is that, assuming that a defendant has
voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination conducted by an ex-
aminer of his own choice, whom the court finds to be competent, it
would seem that the prosecution obviously has the right to request a
second examination. 195 In fact, a procedure governing such an exami-
nation is set out in Ridling,9 6 with the examiner chosen by agreement
190. 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973).
191. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 1974).
192. Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 339, 341 (D. Ariz. 1970). For a thorough
discussion of the application of relevant Fifth Amendment principles, see Note, Problems
Remaining for the "Generally Accepted" Polygraph, 53 B.U.L. Ruv. 375, 390-400
(1973). Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and Griffin v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), with POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35. See also United
States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 97-98 (E.D. Mich. 1972); People v. Adams, No.
M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974) at 12-13; Com-
monwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 1974) (before granting defend-
ant's motion to permit polygraph examination, defendant must be informed of his con-
stitutional rights and make voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver thereof).
193. 350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
194. People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Miun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal.
May 14, 1974) at 13.
195. This problem was apparently overlooked in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313
N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974). If the opinion is interpreted in light of its rather lengthy
discussion of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to imply that such a second examina-
tion cannot be constitutionally compelled, this would seem a serious limitation on the
decision to encourage trial courts to utilize their discretion to admit polygraph evidence.
However, it would appear that the omission by the court was not intended to preclude
such a subsequent examination.
196. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 97, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972). This
approach is also suggested in People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los
Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974) at 13.
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of the parties or, if an agreement cannot be reached, by the court.
This approach was utilized in the California Polygraph Bill proposed
in the 1973 Senate session. 197
A second objection is that polygraph testimony would largely con-
sist of self-serving hearsay. In United States v. Stromberg,198 Judge
Kaufman noted: "But a machine cannot be examined or cross-exam-
ined; its 'testimony,' as interpreted by an expert is, in that sense, the
most glaring and blatant hearsay."' 99  It is submitted that this position
is patently absurd; the logic would apply equally to radar, drunko-
meters, voice spectrographs, neutron analysis, or computers. The ex-
pert, not the machine, testifies. The results on the machine merely
provide data upon which he bases his opinion. The defendant's own
statements are not hearsay, since they are not being admitted for the
"truth of the assertion," but rather merely for the limited purpose of
forming the basis of the expert's opinion, as in psychiatry.209 It has
even been suggested by one court that because of the "great reliability"
of polygraph results, they should serve as an exception to the hearsay
rule;21 however, it is unnecessary to take -that additional step in light
of the acceptable rationale discussed above.
A third "minor" objection is that admission of polygraph evidence
would require such prolonged adjudication in each case that it would
overly burden the administration of justice.202 In any jurisdiction
where the reliability of the polygraph is judicially noticed (as, where
admissibility has been permitted by an appellate court), all that is re-
quired in any particular case is the qualification and testimony of the
expert examiner.2 0'
Some critics have also contended that the delay between the crim-
inal event and the examination lessens the accuracy and reliability of
the test results. One polygraph authority has testified about two per-
sonal experiences involving lengthy time lapses (one of seven years,
197. See S.B. 119 § 898.4(a)-(b) (1973), as amended in Assembly Aug. 19, 1974.
For the text of S.B. 119, see note 263 infra.
198. 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
199. Id. at 280.
200. See United States v. Parmen, 461 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
201. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
202. United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1973). The
Urquidez court conducted an extensive, and no doubt confusing, hearing to establish the
"foundation" for reliability of the polygraph. See note 172 supra. Such a hearing was
probably not necessary in the Ninth Circuit at the time. See note 203 & accompanying
text in!ra.
203. This is probably the situation at the present time in the Ninth Circuit, for ex-
ample. See notes 155-61 & accompanying text supra.
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the other of thirty-four years) in which convicted and imprisoned crim-
inals asserted their innocence but, after polygraph examinations in-
dicated that they were not telling the truth, later confessed their actual
guilt.
204
Objections have been raised to the introduction og test results
when the examination is conducted by a polygrapher selected by the
defendant. Allegedly, examinations administered by ,a "friendly"
examiner are less reliable, since the subject knows that unfavorable re-
sults will be confidential. Therefore, he has less fear that his deception
will be detected, which will diminish the physiological responses to un-
truthful answers.20 5  The theory was first propounded by Dr. Martin
C. Orne, the government expert in United States v. Zeiger,206 but his
own research demonstrates that criminal defendants, tested by a so-
called "friendly" examiner, are sufficiently motivated to ensure ac-
curate results. 0 7
Anyone who understands the control question technique recog-
nizes that complete lack of motivation yields inconclusive rather than
erroneous results. It is necessary to have substantial reactions to con-
trol questions in order to arrive at a decision that the subject is truthful;
failure to respond leads only to a judgment of inconclusiveness, rather
than error. The only scientific study of the "friendly" polygrapher
problem, based upon records of examinations of criminal defendants,
clearly established that there was no difference in the rates of decep-
tive, truthful, and inconclusive results when tests conducted for defense
attorneys were compared to those administered for the police agen-
cies.20
8
204. See POLYGRAPH iN CouRT, supra note 35, at 68 (testimony of Leonard H. Har-
relson).
205. Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 413
(1974) (testimony of Henry S. Dogin, deputy asst. attorney general) in 16 CRim. L.
RP-R. 2306, 2307 (1974).
206. 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972).
207. Gustafson & Orne, Effects of Heightened Motivation on the Detection of De-
ception, 47 J. APPLmD PSYCH. 408-11 (1963). Orne established that subjects were suffi-
ciently motivated to produce conclusive polygraph results when the only motivating
factor was the examiner's suggestion that an intelligent subject could deceive the poly-
grapher. The motivations for a criminal defendant to avoid detection are much higher.
There is the possibility of seeking dismissal of the charges if the subject is found to be
truthful. Furthermore, a deceptive result presents the threat of loss of the subject's cred-
ibility in the eyes of his attorney and the possibility that he might resign from the case
or urge his client to plead guilty.
208. As part of his project at the University of Utah, under a grant from the Na-
tional Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (see note 241 infra), Dr.
David Raskin analyzed over 200 examinations conducted by Ted Ponticelli, approxi-
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United States v. Wilson: The "Major" Objections
The Wilson case2° 9 raises the remainder of the important ob-
jections to admissibility of polygraph evidence. The court, however,
cited no persuasive precedent or scientific studies210 to support any of
its conclusions.21' In rejecting the polygraph evidence, the court as-
serted:
A fair statement is that while studies conducted by private and gov-
ernmental organizations assess the validity and reliability of the
technique at 70% .to 95%,212 the systematic research relating to
the validity of polygraph is still in its formative period and is on-
going.
• . . Like polygraphy, the physical sciences often rely on non-
physical intellectual models . . . [b]ut . . . these processes are
much more susceptible to controlled experimental verification.-2 1 3
Although it is true that the polygraph technique was initially de-
veloped in the field, with scientific evaluation following, 214 numerous
controlled systematic studies (described in some detail earlier)21 ' have
been recorded. For example, in the study by John Reid and Frank
Horvath, the results, which established the polygraph's extremely high
accuracy, were corroborated by the strongest possible objective evi-
dence, actual confessions.2 16 In the laboratory, D. T. Lykken eval-
mately half for defense attorneys without the knowledge of the prosecution, and the bal-
ance for the Costa Mesa police department. He produced the following data:
Deceptive Truthful Inconclusive Total
Defense 20 (20.4%) 76(77.6%) 2 (2 %) 98
Police 21 (19.8%) 80(75.5%) 5 (4.7%) 106
209. 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973).
210. While Wilson does list several transcripts and articles which were read in the
course of deciding the case (including the author's amicus brief in United States v. De-
Betham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972)) it cites none of these "authorities" for
any of its specific criticisms of the polygraph. See 361 F. Supp. at 511.
211. In People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County,
Cal. May 14, 1974), the trial court considered all the objections raised in Wilson, reach-
ing a contrary result on each point. However, in an opinion designed to test the present
state of the law in California, the court refused to admit the evidence. See text follow-
ing note 69 supra.
212. While it is true that a few individuals have estimated the accuracy of poly-
graphs as low as 70%, the overwhelming majority believe its accuracy is in excess of
85% with most of those estimating over 90%. See notes 58-82 & accompanying text
supra.
213. 361 F. Supp. at 512-13.
214. Barland & Raskin, An Experimental Study of Field Techniques in "Lie Detec-
tion," paper presented at the Society for Psychophysiological Research, St. Louis, Mo.,
Oct. 24, 1971, in POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, addendum II, and quoted in
United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
215. See generally notes 58-82 & accompanying text supra.
216. See notes 81-82 & accompanying text supra.
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uated the accuracy of the polygraph in excess of 93 percent in a situa-
tion in which the results were obviously susceptible of objective evalua-
tion since Dr. Lykken knew which subjects had been told to pretend
that they either had, or had not, committed a crime.217  Moreover, it
has been established -that results in the field are even more accurate
than those in the laboratory, since responses measured by the polygraph
technique are more pronounced when the subject is highly motivated
and the material involved is personal to the subject."' 8
Another objection raised by the Wilson court was that
polygraphy, albeit based on a scientific theory, remains an art with
unusual responsibility placed on the examiner ....
The subtleties of physiological and psychological reaction also
result in divergence in interpretation of the polygraph charts and
the consistency of reaction necessary to reach a definite conclu-
sion..2 1
9
Wilson is totally incorrect to the extent that it suggests that inter-
pretation of polygraph charts-as opposed, e.g., to analysis of hand-
writing or ballistics-is essentially subjective, varying from polygrapher
to polygrapher. For example, in the United States Army, charts of all
polygraph tests administered in the field are reevaluated by a Quality
Control Office. Errors by the field examiners are discovered very
rarely by -the examiners reviewing the charts.220 Presumably the ex-
aminers usually agree in their interpretation. Moreover, in an experi-
ment by Gordon Barland of the University of Utah, five trained exam-
iners reached almost identical conclusions in evaluating over 200 charts
from over seventy subject examinees, even though the examiners knew
nothing about the subjects and had only the charts and relevant ques-
tions on which to base their conclusions.22" '
Similarly, in the experiment by Reid and Horvath22 the charts
217. See note 83 supra.
218. See notes 86-88 & accompanying text supra.
219. 361 F. Supp. at 512-13. A similar argument is raised in Commonwealth v.
A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Mass. 1974). See note 172 supra.
220. POLYGRAPH IN CouRT, supra note 35, at 64 (testimony of Claybourne Lowry,
retired U.S. Army polygraph examiner). In fact, in the Mai Lai cases stemming from
the Viet Nam war, polygraph charts from the field were simultaneously reproduced in
Washington. Obviously, this procedure could only be undertaken if the charts them-
selves were susceptible of objective interpretation. In fact, both polygraphers in the field
in Viet Nam and those in Washington reached extremely similar numerical results. Tes-
timony of Ted Ponticelli, Case Review Officer (polygraph examiner and criminal inves-
tigator, Department of the Army), in People v. Cutler, No. A176965 (Super. Ct. Los
Angeles County, Cal. Nov. 6, 1972), 12 CasM. L. RPrR. 2133 (1972).
221. See notes 76-77 & accompanying text supra.
222. See notes 81-82 & accompanying text supra.
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were evaluated with over 90 percent accuracy by seven experienced
examiners who knew nothing about the particular subjects or the ques-
tions asked; they were told only where the relevant questions were lo-
cated on the chart. Clearly the analysis of polygraph charts is not "sub-
jective" when two competent polygraph examiners will almost always
reach the same results223 when interpreting charts.
A third objection of the Wilson court was based on speculation
concerning the "limitations" of the technique, or more specifically, pos-
sibilities of "beating" the test:
[T]he examiner must carefully watch for signs of psychosis, ex-
treme neurosis, psychopathology, drunkenness and drugs ....
[S]peculation survives that a portion of the population, sometimes
called "pathological liars," can "beat" the machine ...
. . . The failure of a subject to react to a relevant question
may be attributable to a yoga-like abstraction of the mind or perhaps
even unusually low blood pressure, coupled with control of breath-
ing. Alternatively, the subject may attempt to react artificially to
irrelevant questions by hidden muscle contractions or self-infliction
of pain, and by artificial conjuring of exciting images. 224
Undoubtedly, the speculative possibilities which might affect the
results of a scientific test could be massed against any discipline. The
list of supposed deficiencies voiced against the polygraph technique
contains factually incorrect information and "limitations" which, though
having some validity, are so obscure or occur so rarely in the test situa-
tion that it is ridiculous to raise such arguments against admission of
the polygraph.2 25 According to one study, attempts to deceive the
polygraph, even by those who are guilty, occur less than 20 percent
of the time228 and are easily detected. 22r Moreover, an experienced
223. Though the experts differ on the exact degree of accuracy, almost all authori-
ties agree that it ranges from 85% to almost 99%. See notes 58-82 & accompanying
text supra. See also POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 14 (testimony of Cleve
Backster); id. at 45 (testimony of John Reid); id. at 70 (testimony of Leonard H. Har-
relson, director of Keeler Institute, a major polygraph school).
224. 361 F. Supp. at 512-13; cf. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120,
125 (Mass. 1974) ("IT]he undisputed fact [is] that some persons can tell undetectable
lies, e.g., pathological liars, emotionally unresponsive subjects who have rationalized
their behavior .... ").
225. See People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County,
Cal. May 14, 1974). "As to the physical condition of the examinee which may affect
the test, the Court is satisfied that a trained, experienced operator can and will detect
such conditions if they are sufficiently serious to materially affect the results of the test."
Id. at 10.
226. In a five year study by Reid and Inbau, less than 20% of those who were
guilty even attempted to fool the polygraph. Barland & Raskin, supra note 34, at 458.
227. The experienced polygrapher will readily observe "clues" which will indicate
countermeasures are being attempted by the subject. People v. Adams, No. M69424
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examiner has available specific procedures to counter every one of the
attempts to "beat" the -test.228
Experimentation has shown that modified yoga cannot be used to
avoid detection; 229 the very few persons in the Middle East and Orient
who can alter their heart and respiration are relatively easy to deteot.
230
Attempts at controlled breathing are also easily detected and overcome
by the examiner.231
Although there is a conflict as to whether hidden muscle contrac-
tions can affect the results of polygraph tests, this countermeasure is
often detectable.23 2 Self-inflicted pain can result in artificial responses,
(Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974) at 8, 10-11; Barland &
Raskin, supra note 34, at 458.
228. See Barland & Raskin, supra note 34, at 427, 458-70. See also POLYGRAPH
IN COURT, supra note 35, at 11 (testimony of Cleve Backster):
[Q:] "To what extent are there methods that an individual might take to deceive
an examiner, and I suppose the instrument although that would appear to be inappropri-
ate, but to deceive an examiner into thinking that there were no responses when, in fact,
deception was being attempted? Would drugs or any kind of conditioning operate to
deceive an experienced and qualified examiner in your opinion?"
[A:] "I might mention that there are a lot of rumors that are passed around as
to how you can beat the polygraph . . . . mhe person, in order to adequately fool
a polygraph examiner would have to prevent an oncoming reaction. And frankly rve
been in this field and as I say for well over 20 years and I, myself, could not "beat"
the polygraph. So, I don't worry about this. This has never been an actual problem;
it's only been a theoretical problem. There are safeguards that can be put into the poly-
graph technique. For instance, anything that would cause the person not to react prop-
erly would eliminate the reaction on the control question as well as the relevant ques-
tion. Now, if we do not see a capability of reaction during the actual polygraph exami-
nation, let's say within one or two questions on each side of the relevant question, where
we can actually compare the lack of reaction on the relevant question to a presence of,
on the control question, on one side or the other, we would come to no conclusion what-
soever. We would say that temporarily that person was not a fit subject for examining
and continue the examining at a later time. So, the person has not at all beat the ex-
aminer in anyway. He has merely prolonged the examination procedure." See also id.
at 69 (testimony of Leonard Harrelson, polygraph examiner).
229. See Barland &- Raskin, supra note 34, at 459 (study by Moore; study by
Kubis).
230. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1387 n.38 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
See also POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 9 (testimony of Cleve Backster).
231. See Barland & Raskin, supra note 34, at 467-68; POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra
note 35, at 6 (testimony of Cleve Backster): "[AlIthough a person may ordinarily
think that they can consciously control the breathing, any attempt to force a breathing
pattern is recognizable by a trained polygraph examiner and the breathing pattern in-
volves very dramatic suppressions and then compensations for the loss of oxygen during
this suppressed period when the person was under the localized emotional stress of a
question that was bothersome to him. So, these suppressions... form a very readable
pattern .... "
232. See Barland & Raskin, supra note 34, at 465-66 (study by Moore (won't af-
fect). Contra, earlier study by Kubis).
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but it can also be detected. 33 There is a conflict as to whether one
can affect polygraph results by conjuring up exciting images,2 s4 and this
tactic, if effective, is difficult to detect.2 35  In any event, such counter-
measures would not necessarily result in a guilty man passing the poly-
graph, but might merely cause an "inconclusive" test result.2"6 There-
fore, even if, arguendo, the fears of the Wilson court materialize and,
in a rare case, a subject manages to "beat" the examiner, the resulting
error masks "detection" and therefore guilt. It would never involve
the greatest concern of a system dedicated to the presumption of inno-
cence-the conviction of a person who was not guilty.2 37
As for persons suffering from psychosis, neurosis, drunkenness,
and drugs, Professor Reid has found that, if they are afflicted enough
to affect the test, they are easily spotted in a pretest interview by a
competent examiner. 23  In fact, studies indicate that use of tran-
quilizers or stimulants increases the probability of detection. 239 The
dreaded "pathological liar" (if such a psychiatric category exists at all)
hardly constitutes an argument against admission. 240  Research by Dr.
233. Id. at 466-67.
234. Id. at 460-61 (study by Moore (no effect). Contra, earlier study of Kubis
(significant effect)).
235. Id. at 461.
236. See id. at 456-57.
237. See POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 56 (testimony of Lemoyne Sny-
der, a polygraph expert and a medical-legal consultant with a law degree, and a medical
degree from Harvard University): "[N]ow, all the time that I was with the State Police
in Michigan, and we were running people every day ...I don't recall of a single case
of an innocent person being labeled as guilty. A few cases of guilty persons who were
labeled as innocent. Of course, that is accounted for by the fact that some people just
have such low key reactions that there just isn't enough of a variation on their chart
to draw anything, it's too even all the way through [so that there couldn't be sufficient
reaction to even be able to reach a conclusion]."
238. REID & INBAU, supra note 28, at 184. See also POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra
note 35, at 60-61 (testimony of Claybourne Lowry).
239. Barland & Raskin, supra note 34, at 469 (studies by Klump). See also POLY-
GRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 11-12 (testimony of Cleve Backster):
[Q:] "If drugs of some kind were ingested which could, and there are such drugs,
interfere with the pulse beat or the blood pressure or the rate of oxygenation, how would
the examiner know that the person was under the influence of these drugs and therefore
not suitable for an examination?"
[A:] "Actually, again, unless the person was under the effect of some type of
drug to the point where it was extremely obvious from external senses, I don't look at
it as being a very significant problem. ... -I]f anything it was putting them in a bet-
ter state for the polygraph examination. We've had people that have tried to use stimu-
lants but all that does is exaggerate the size of the present reaction that would exist any-
way and it just is no problem."
240. See POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 12 (testimony of Cleve Backster):
[Q:] "Now, with reference to various kinds of individuals, and I refer now to
mental condition, supposing a sociopath or a person who congenitally has a low level
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Raskin has shown that psychopaths are as easy to detect in deception
as other criminal subjects.241 Certainly, infinitely more "liars" sway
the hearts of the jury from the stand than could ever deceive a poly-
graph.
The Wilson court's fourth objection concerned "[tihe absence of
national standards for the education of polygraph examiners . . . . [IMt
is admitted that there exist numerous incompetent examiners. ' 242  As
stressed throughout this article and by numerous courts, the importance
of a qualified examiner cannot be overestimated since a "truly qualified
polygraph examiner can eliminate or prevent test errors arising from
an unfit subject or improper examination conditions ... 243 Al-
though there is no doubt that there are incompetent examiners, just
as there are incompetent physicians, one hardly need draw the conclu-
sion that the courts are incapable of insuring that only qualified poly-
graph examiners are permitted to testify. The DeBetham court had
no doubt that the competence of examiners could be determined with-
out any undue consumption of time through proper examination and
cross-examination; 244 and the Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v.
A Juvenile felt that this determination could be satisfactorily made
"through close scrutiny by the trial judge of an examiner's qualifica-
tions" and by highly motivating the defendant to assure the reliability
of the expert "by requiring the defendant to agree in advance (with
all the proper [constitutional] safeguards) to the results of a polygraph
of social concern, in other words, really doesn't care or feel badly about what he's done,
even though it's criminal, supposing he encounters a polygraph examination, is there any
reason to believe that because of his state of mind, that he would not respond in a
fashion that would enable you to diagnose deception?"
[A:] "I think this gets into the situation of the very basis upon which the poly-
graph successfully operates. In other words, if we must rely on making a person re-
morseful or let's say feel ashamed for what they have done, I think the polygraph
wouldn't have gotten off home base. In other words, we are not relying at all on the
repentance of the individual or the shame for that which has occurred. ... So, the
idea of the person feeling justified or rationalizing in any way is not allowed to interfere
with the deceptional nature of the technique."
241. In an experiment conducted with prison inmates in British Columbia, Dr. Ras-
kin obtained 95.5% correct identification of truthful and deceptive subjects in a mock-
crime situation even though half of the subjects had been clinically diagnosed as psycho-
paths. Not a single guilty psychopath succeeded in deceiving the examiner. This data
involves a completed portion of a larger study being conducted by Dr. Raskin under a
grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Personal
communication with Dr. Raskin, January 1975.
242. 361 F. Supp. at 513.
243. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
244. Id. See also, e.g., People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los
Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974) at 9.
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test [being admitted in the case]." '245
Even Wilson implies that states with stringent licensing proce-
dures246 would not face any substantial problems as to the quality of
experts.24? However, even without a licensing system, clear standards
for qualification as an expert have been proposed by recognized author-
ities and have been embodied in judicial opinion.248 Moreover, ap-
pointment of experts from either an approved court list 24 9 or by stipula-
tion of the parties250 will help insure competent experts. Although the
qualification of expert polygraphers is a serious concern, it is easily
dealt with through procedures readily available to the court. 251
Another objection voiced by the Wilson court concerned "the dis-
proportionate influence the polygraph examination evidence inevitably
will exercise. . . . The spectre of 'trial by polygraph' replacing trial
245. 313 N.E.2d 120, 126 (Mass. 1974).
246. See note 188 supra.
247. 361 F. Supp. at 513. See also notes 276-79 & accompanying text infra.
248. E.g., United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1386 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
quoting RawD & INBAU, supra note 28, at 257: "Before permitting the results to be admit-
ted as evidence in any case, however, the courts should require the following: (1) That
the examiner possesses a college degree. (2) That he has received at least 6 months
of internship training under an experienced, competent examiner or examiners with a
sufficient volume of case work to afford frequent supervised testing in actual case situa-
tions. (3) That the witness have at least 5 years' experience as a specialist in the field
of polygraph examinations." This same list is cited as an example in Commonwealth
v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 126 n.6 (Mass. 1974), though the court therein did "not
think it wise at this time to limit the trial judge's discretion on matters of expert testi-
mony by formulating strict minimum standards as prerequisites to qualification of poly-
graph experts." Id. See also People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los
Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974) at 8-9.
The DeBetham court suggested cross-examination "upon the particular examiner's
testing technique and reputation for competence and integrity." 348 F. Supp. at 1386;
cf. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 690 (D.D.C. 1972) (court did not hesi-
tate to examine the witness's qualifications which were held to be sufficient even though
he lacked a college degree).
Stringent national standards have been developed at the major polygraph schools.
See, e.g., POLYGRAPH IN CoURT, supra note 35, at 13-14 (testimony of Cleve Backster
on standards at military polygraphy school at Fort Gordon).
249. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 96 (E.D. Mich. 1972). See
notes 276-79 & accompanying text infra.
250. See notes 176-89 & accompanying text supra.
251. It is interesting to note that expert testimony regarding voice prints was admit-
ted in California cases when the only standards for an examiner were proposed by a
group consisting of less than a half-dozen out of thousands of acoustics experts. Even
these standards were not met by Lt. Nash, the prosecutor's examiner in most of the
cases. See, e.g., People v. Lawton, No. CR-9485 (Riverside Super. Ct. San Bernardino
County, Cal. 1973) (testimony of Dr. Tosi and Lt. Nash); People v. Law, 40 Cal. App.
3d 69 (1974); Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973).
See note 107 supra.
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by jury is more than a felicitous slogan." '  Of course, when courts
have admitted polygraph test results they have instructed the jury that
the result is not to be considered evidence of innocence or guilt, but
is only to go to the credibility of the witness, to be weighed with the.
other evidence, and to be subjected to the same critical standards as
other expert opinion.253
To those who fear "usurpation" of the jury function through undue
reliance by the jury on polygraph evidence, there are three answers.
The first is that if a polygraph examination conducted by a competent
examiner is as accurate as indicated,254 it merits such substantial reli-
ance in a process whose primary purpose is the search for "truth." The
second is that recognized experts in the field agree that the administra-
tion of justice would not collapse, but would improve, with the intro-
duction of polygraph evidence.255 Jurors would not be overawed by
the polygrapher's testimony, since he, like any other expert, can be sub-
jected to careful and searching cross-examination.250 Indeed, the
252. 361 F. Supp. at 513. The Wilson court also noted that the polygraph result
may go to the "ultimate issue." Id. at 511. However, this is hardly different from
when a handwriting expert testifies in a forgery case or radar is used in a speeding case.
Moreover, fears about "usurping" the function of the jury obviously do not arise in non-
jury situations, such as motions to suppress (e.g., People v. Cutler, No. A176965 (Super.
Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. Nov. 6, 1972), 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2133 (1972)); trials
to the court (e.g., United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972));
or sentencing hearings (e.g., State v. Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 213, 278 A.2d 543
(1971)). In any event, both CAL. EvID. CODE § 805 (West 1966) and the new Federal
Rule 704 (reproduced in 43 U.S.L.W. 137, 141 (Jan. 14, 1975)) permit an expert to
give an opinion even though it goes to the ultimate issue.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972); State
v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
254. See notes 58-60, 76-82, 214-23 & accompanying text supra.
255. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 129 (Mass. 1974);
State v. Alderete, 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138, 142 (1974) (Lopez, J., concurring);
POLYGRAPH IN COURT, supra note 35, at 48 (testimony of John Reid); id. at 62 (testi-
mony of Clayboume Lowry); id. at 79 (testimony of Robert A. Brisentine).
256. See POLYGRAPH iN COURT, supra note 35, at 44 (testimony of John Reid).
Mr. Reid testified that cross-examination could expose any deficiencies in either the
polygraph examination or examiner, and that the relevant information available in the
literature would provide an adequate basis for such a challenge, as would the testimony
of any one of "a great number of the different men that are prominent in the field."
See also id. at 64 (testimony of Clayboume Lowry). According to Mr. Lowry, there
is probably less than a one-half of 1% chance that an examiner's error could go unde-
tected.
It is arguable, however, that the function of the jury could be "usurped" if polygraph
testimony was permitted when the defendant did not take the stand. In contrast to its
use as corroborating or impeaching testimony, the admission of such evidence when a
defendant chooses not to testify would be "a substitute for direct testimony [and] would
take away any opportunity for a cross-examination or for the jury to observe the de-
meanor and manner of testifying of the witness." State v. Nemoir, 62 Wis. 2d 206, 215,
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's recent opinion stressed the im-
portance of potential cross-examination by "both parties, depending on
the outcome of the polygraph results and by whom the expert is called
as a witness . . .regardless of who originally selected the expert wit-
ness.
257
The third answer is that the concern for the "overwhelming im-
pact" of the polygraph is greatly exaggerated and totally unjustified
when viewed in the context of several actual cases in which polygraph
evidence was admitted.
The suggestion that juries will follow blindly after polygraph results
is an unfounded fear. Juries are all too capable of disregarding
any evidence to which they do not take a shine. In Common-
wealth v. George 0. Edgerly, No. 95459, Middlesex Superior
Court, 1961, polygraph test results adverse to the defendant were
admitted by agreement of counsel, but the jury acquitted the de-
fendant of murder.258
In United States v. Grasso,259 polygraph evidence was admitted
after a proper foundation had been established. Following a verdict
of not guilty, the jury was interviewed regarding their comprehension
of the expert testimony and its effect on their decision.260  The
responses of the jurors are enlightening:
These eight jurors -told us thaft they were impressed with the
foundation testimony and were convinced that the polygraph did
what it purported to do, i.e., to verify the truthfulness of a response
to any given question. However, despite their belief in the efficacy
of the polygraph as a truth verifier, they were somewhat at a loss
regarding what to do with the impact of the testimony of Mr.
Charles H. Zimmerman on the test result itself. Therefore, they
214 N.W.2d 297, 301-02 (1974) (improper to consider admitting polygraph testimony
if there is no offer of proof that defendant intends to take the stand); accord, S.B. 119
§ 898.4(c) (1973), as amended in Assembly Aug. 19, 1974 (polygraph only admissible
if examined party testifies). For the text of S.B. 119, see note 263 infra.
257. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 1974).
258. Brief for Defendant at 39, Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 191
N.E.2d 479 (1963); accord, Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 32, People v. Lazaros,
CR-6237 (Oakland County, Mich. Cir. June 23, 1970); see, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 523
P.2d 1232 (Utah 1974) (polygraph evidence of innocence, but jury found defendant
guilty).
John Reid, polygraph examiner, has testified: "I think the juries are quite sophisti-
cated, from my experience with juries over the years. I think that it is a system that
if they had some definite prejudice going into the jury room, I am sure it would be dis-
missed and handled pretty easily. I am quite sure that this would not be an over-influ-
ence on the jury." Testimony of John Reid at evidentiary hearing in People v. Lazaros,
CR-6237 (Oakland County, Mich. Cir. June 23, 1970). See also People v. Adams, No.
M69424 (Alhambra Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal. May 14, 1974) at 13-14.
259. CR-79-179-LC (D. Mass. June, 1973).
260. A summary of the responses was published in Barnett, How Does a Jury View
Polygraph Results?, 2:4 POLYGRAPH 275 (1972).
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resolved to put aside the test results and see if they could not arrive
at a verdict by considering the other evidence that was present at
the trial and, should Jhey be unable to do so, they would then turn
to the polygraph test results as an additional piece of evidence to
consider. Well, the fact of the matter is that they never got to the
polygraph test results in so far as taking any part in their delibera-
tions because they were able to arrive at a verdict of not guilty
based upon the other evidence in the case. However, each of the
eight Jurors that we interviewed was fairly positive that had the
case been closer, i.e., had the outcome been in doubt, the poly-
graph tests standing by themselves and the integrity of the testi-
mony would have been sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in
their minds and, consequently, they would had to have voted not
guilty.
The interviews that we had with the Jurors in the Grasso case
would seem to refute the often heard comment that the polygraph
will replace the Jury or usurp the Jury's functions, or somehow be
so prejudicial in its weight and impact that the Jury will disregard
al other evidence and go on the polygraph test results alone. Here
we have direct proof that, at least in one case, not only did the
polygraph test results not usurp the Jury's function but they were
able to handle it in much the same manner they did all other evi-
dence in the case.
They certainly were not overawed by it, they certainly did not
feel that the polygraph test results by themselves were demon-
strative of the guilt or innocence of Mr. Grasso and I think they
handled the polygraph evidence in a very intelligent manner and
certainly if they are at all representative of Jurors who have to deal
with polygraph -test results, then I think that we should be heart-
ened to learn that they can consider such evidence and accord it
whatever merit it deserves and treat it, perhaps in the same way
as they do all other scientific evidence.
2 1
Proposals for a Comprehensive Legislative Response to Polygraph:
The California Experience
On January 29, 1973, Senator Arlen Gregorio 262 introduced
Senate Bill 119203 in the California Senate. Although the bill was
261. Id. at 276-77 (emphasis added). It seems important to note that the jurors
put no unusual weight on the polygraph; in fact, it seems to have been given even less
weight than other evidence even though they were impressed with the foundation testi-
mony and "convinced that the polygraph [would] . . . verify the truthfulness of a re-
sponse ....... Id.
262. D-San Mateo, California. The author collaborated extensively with Senator
Gregorio in drafting the original bill and its revisions.
263. The version of the bill as amended in the Assembly August 19, 1974 is in-
cluded herein in its entirety:
"PROPOSED TEXT OF S.B. 119
"Section 1. Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 898.1) is added to Division 7
of the Evidence Code to read:
"Chapter 3. Polygraph Examinations
"898.1 As used in this chapter:
POLYGRAPH
eventually defeated in the eleven man California Assembly Committee
on the Judiciary (having been approved by the corresponding thirteen
man committee in the Senate and sent to the Senate floor on May 3,
1973, where it was passed on May 9, 1973), it should be carefully ex-
"(a) 'Polygraph examination' or 'examination' means the testing or questioning of
individuals and the simultaneous recordation thereof, by means of any instrument or de-
vice of any type which is capable of measuring and permanently recording at least these
physiological phenomena: (1) cardiovascular reactions, (2) respiratory pattern, and (3)
the galvanic skin response, for the purpose of diagnosing truth or deception.
"(b) 'Polygraph' means any instrument or device referred to in subdivision (a).
"(c) 'Examiner' means any person who operates a polygraph.
"(d) 'Examinee' means any person who submits to a polygraph examination.
"(e) 'Testing phase' means the time during which the polygraph is in operation.
"(f) 'Results' means the opinion of the examiner based upon auditory and visual re-
cordings made during the polygraph examination.
"898.2 The results of polygraph examinations administered by examiners qualified
pursuant to Section 898.3 are admissible in all civil proceedings in courts of record upon
the conditions set forth in this chapter, provided, that any such examination shall have
been authorized or required by a court order which was issued not later than two years
after the panel commences to qualify examiners under Section 898.3.
"898.3 Not later than December 31, 1975, the Judicial Council shall by rule estab-
lish procedures and standards which shall provide for the qualification of examiners by
a panel of five members, four of whom shall be trial court judges or former trial court
judges appointed by the Judicial Council and one of whom shall be an attorney ap-
pointed by the State Bar of California.
"It is the intent of the Legislature that examiners qualified under this section shall
be of the very highest professional competence and integrity.
"898.4 (a) Except as provided in this chapter, the results of a polygraph examina-
tion shall be admissible under this chapter only if the court, upon the motion of the
party who intends to introduce such results, issues an order permitting the examination.
In addition to any other requirements imposed by law, the notice of such motion shall
include a statement of the facts at issue upon which the examinee shall be examined,
the name of the examinee, the name and business address of the examiner, the time and
address of the examination, and shall further set forth the questions to be propounded
to the examinee. The moving party shall make a showing that admission of polygraph
results is necessary to assist the trier of fact in evaluating the veracity of a party or
witness with respect to an essential fact at issue in the proceeding. Upon the motion
of any party, and for good cause, the court may order the modification or deletion of
questions to be propounded to the examinee. Except as provided in subdivision (b),
the results of a polygraph examination shall be admissible under this chapter only upon
a finding by the court that the examinee voluntarily submitted to the examination.
"(b) The court, upon the motion of any party, shall issue an order requiring that
any party or witness undergoing an examination authorized by an order issued pursuant
to subdivision (a) shall, as a condition to the admission into evidence of the results,
submit to an examination administered by another examiner mutually agreed upon by
the parties or, in the absence of such agreement, appointed by the court. The subject
matter of such examination shall be substantially the same as the subject matter of the
examination authorized pursuant to subdivision (a). Upon the motion of any party the
court may further order that, as a condition to the admission into evidence of the results
of any examination conducted pursuant to subdivision (a), the results of any other ex-
amination of the examinee on substantially the same subject matter by an examiner qual-
ified under Section 898.3 shall also be admitted into evidence.
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amined because of its comprehensive treatment of the various problems
related to the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The bill, or an
amended version of it, will probably be reintroduced at the next term
of the legislature. 64 If passed, it will undoubtedly serve as a model
for other states and for courts considering procedures governing prob-
lems related to admissibility.
Senate Bill 119 can best be characterized as a legislative attempt
to deal with the admission of polygraph evidence and related problems
in a systematized, coherent fashion. Confronted with increasing
judicial acceptance of the polygraph, 65 the legislature appropriately
sought this systematic approach rather than a piecemeal, case-by-case
judicial resolution of the problems associated with the admissibility of
polygraph test results.2 66
"(c) The results of an examination authorized pursuant to this chapter shall not
be admissible unless testimony of the examinee has been admitted in the proceeding on
the subject matter of such examination.
"(d) Polygraph examinations authorized or required by the court shall take place
not less than seven days after the order is issued. The results of a polygraph examina-
tion shall not be admitted into evidence less than 20 days after the date of examination.
Upon the motion of any party and for good cause, the court may order the reduction
of the minimum time periods set forth in this subdivision.
"(e) Each question by the examiner and each answer by the examinee during the
testing phase of the polygraph examination shall be electronically recorded.
"898.5 The court in its discretion may exclude the results of a polygraph examina-
tion or the content of the control question, as that term is customarily defined in the
polygraph profession, and the answer thereto, if their probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the probability that their admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.
"898.6 This chapter shall not prohibit or otherwise apply to the admission into evi-
dence of the results of a polygraph examination pursuant to a stipulation by the parties,
including a stipulation made by a party prior to submitting to an examination, that the
result shall be admissible.
"898.7 Neither the court nor any party shall have the right to comment on the fail-
ure of another party or witness to submit to a polygraph examination or to introduce
the results.
"898.8 All other provisions of this code not inconsistent with the provisions of this
chapter shall apply to the introduction of results of polygraph examinations into evi-
dence under this chapter."
264. Upon request of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California at its
September 1973 meeting, a committee was selected to submit a report on the use of poly-
graph evidence in civil trials and to present a position as to California S.B. 119. After
several meetings and the assimilation of a great deal of evidence and material, the com-
mittee submitted a highly favorable report on January 2, 1974; however, for still unex-
plained reasons, the Board of Governors did not release the report, but instead sent it
back to the committee.
265. See notes 151-73 & accompanying text supra.
266. Some have also argued, with force, that the polygraph is a "great leveller,"
whereby the poor, inarticulate party can contend with a wealthy, educated opponent.
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The bill deals with the numerous problems which have previously
been discussed. It clearly expresses an intention to favor the use of
polygraph evidence as a reliable credibility-detecting device and there-
fore to create a weapon against the wave of perjury confronting the
courts.2 67  In addition, the bill confronts the Fifth Amendment prob-
lems and objections based upon invasion of privacy by establishing that
a party must consent to taking a polygraph examination.2 68 The poly-
graph cannot be used unless the party testifies,26 9 and no mention may
be made of a party's failure to submit to a polygraph examination.270
Moreover, the great "consumption of judicial time" required to estab-
lish a foundation for admissibility is avoided by this legislative recogni-
tion of the accuracy of a properly administered polygraph examina-
tion. 1
Two features of S.B. 119 attempt to cope with the major criticism
of admitting polygraph evidence, the lack of qualification of many
polygraphersY.27  The first requires that anyone desiring to introduce
polygraph evidence must consent to a second examination by a stip-
ulated examiner or by a court appointed expert if the parties fail to
agree on an examiner. 27 3  This second "neutral" expert will both as-
sure quality and avoid a battle of charlatans. Further, if the two ex-
perts disagree, the court may refuse admission of the conflicting testi-
mony in its discretion -to exclude unduly prejudicial or confusing poly-
graph evidence. 4
Hearings on Cal. S.B. 119 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (testimony of
Fred Barnett, Esq.) (March 27, 1973).
267. See notes 1-27 & accompanying text supra.
268. S.B. 119 § 898.4(a) (1973), as amended in Assembly Aug. 19, 1974; cf. Com-
monwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 1974). See also notes 191-97
& accompanying text supra.
269. See S.B. 119 § 898.4(c), supra note 263.
270. See id. § 898.7.
271. See note 162 supra.
272. See notes 242-51 & accompanying text supra.
273. See S.B. 119 § 898.4(b), supra note 263.
274. Id. § 898.5. The court is given discretion to eliminate or restrict polygraph
evidence whenever its probative value is outweighed by either undue consumption of time
or danger of undue prejudice, confusion, or misleading of the jury. In the case where
the two experts disagree, the polygraph will arguably no longer be an "aid" to the jury,
but rather will involve a lengthy and collateral battle of the experts. In such circum-
stances the court should exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence. Cf. CAL. EVIl.
CODE § 352 (West 1966).
This approach in S.B. 119 providing clear standards and parameters for the exercise
of judicial discretion should be contrasted with the current approach adopted by the
United States Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit where standardless "discretion" is
becoming a synonym for exclusion at the whim of the trial court. See notes 163-66
& accompanying text supra.
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The second safeguard in S.B. 119 is the establishment of standards
and methods for qualifying experts. In the version of S.B. 119 which
passed the Senate, qualification of polygraph experts was left to the
court on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.27 5 Undoubtedly recognizing
that such a procedure will lead to an undue consumption of judicial
time and a probable lack of uniformity in the quality of experts, the
revision of S.B. 119 provided for a five member panel, appointed by
the Judicial Council, to determine which polygraph examiners were
qualified to testify in court.27 6  The panel was to be composed of four
trial court judges or former trial court judges and one attorney277 who
would have made their determination as to the qualifications of exam-
iners by applying procedures and standards established by the Judicial
Council.27 8  Obviously, the success of such a project would depend on
275. As a result of the concern with the qualifications of experts, the version of
the bill which passed the senate did set extremely stringent standards which the court
was to apply in assessing the qualifications of polygraph experts. S.B. 119 § 898.6
(1973), as amended in Senate May 7, 1973. Under this version not only did the expert
have to meet extensive "minimum" standards including 250 hours of academic class in-
struction, 100 hours of directed practical exercises in polygraph technique and the ad-
ministration of 300 actual examinations, but the clear intent of the statute was to select
only the most qualified from among those who meet these standards. See id. 'The in-
tention of the Legislature is that the examiners qualified under this section shall have
been found by the court to have attained the very highest professional competence, and
shall have been found to meet the following absolute minimum standards. . . ." Id.
§ 898.6(b) (emphasis added). "It is the further intention of the Legislature that in con-
sidering whether an examiner may be qualified as an expert witness, the court shall con-
sider that only a small portion of the examiners meeting the above absolute minimum
standards . . . are of the very highest professional competence." Id. § 898.6(c) (em-
phasis added).
Aside from problems of undue consumption of time and lack of uniformity in this
approach, discussed above, any minimum standards should require an apprenticeship pro-
gram under which the polygrapher is tested to assure that not only has he or she admin-
istered "300 polygraph examinations" but that they have been properly conducted. Rum
& INmAu, supra note 28, at 257.
276, See S.B. 119 § 898.3, supra note 263.
277. Drawing the panel from attorneys and judges rather than members of the Cali-
fornia Association of Polygraph Examiners avoids what would be a de facto "Grand-
father Clause." Under no circumstances, whether by provision or practice, should the
quality of approved examiners be diluted by such a "Grandfather Clause."
278. See S.B. 119 § 898.3, supra note 263. In addition, the council is empow-
ered to delineate those issues and types of proceedings in respect to which, in the interest
of justice, polygraph examinations will not be admissible. S.B. 119 § 898.3(b), as
amended in Assembly May 15, 1974; this provision was deleted from the version of the
bill that appears in note 263 supra. Although this task is clearly more manageable than
compiling a list of those issues and proceedings in which polygraph evidence is admis-
sible, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine any specific matters or proceedings as to
which such evidence should be uniformly banned. Most likely, such a power (if restored
to the bill) would be applied exactly as § 898.5, setting general standards of probative
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the council's enactment of viable yet stringent limitations and standards,
and on the quality of the screening function performed by the panel.
This would also further the legislative intent that examiners who qualify
under this section "be of the very highest professional competence and
integlity.'' 279 In any event, S.B. 119 is a necessary and a well thought
out experiment in the use of polygraph examinations in court.280
Conclusion
The reliability and validity of the polygraph technique and its
probative value as evidence of credibility can no longer be doubted.
What remains is the task of helping the judicial system free itself of
erroneous conceptions about what Justice Traynor called a "lie detec-
tor."'2 ' In 1923, the year of the Frye case, Dean Wigmore foresaw:
"'If there is ever devised a psychological test for the valuation of wit-
nesses, the law will run to meet it.' "282 It has taken a half-century,
but polygraphy and the law at last may be about to meet each other.
value versus prejudicial harm, rather than prohibiting polygraph evidence as to specified
issues or proceedings.
279. See id. § 898.3.
280. One aspect of the proposed redraft which may be confusing is the apparent
requirement that the party proposing the introduction of a polygraph examination must
show that it is "necessary" to assist the trier of fact. Id. § 898.4(a).
281. As with other evidence, however, the drafters intended only that the polygraph
evidence be "helpful" or "probative." Unfortunately, they clouded this intent by the se-
lection of the word "necessary," which as far as this author knows, has no clearly under-
stood meaning or application in the law of evidence.
282. 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 875 (2d ed. 1923).
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